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INTRODUCTION
This report contains a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis
of the Space Tug Propulsion System. The analysis is broken down into
the primary subsystems which comprise the Propulsion System. The results
of each of the subsystems analyses are detailed in this report under
their individual nomenclatures.
The Space Tug Propulsion System analyzed in this report includes the main
propulsion system, the thermal control system and the auxiliary
propulsion system. The main propulsion system consists of the main
engine, transfer system, propellant conditioning and utilization system.
The thermal control system consists of the necessary tank insulation
and associated purge system to maintain the propellants in a usable
liquid state throughout the mission. The auxiliary propulsion system
(APS) consists of sixteen thrusters to perform coast attitude stabilization,
rendezvous and docking maneuvers. The APS system also consists of
propellant storage tanks and conditioning and feed systems that are
necessary to provide the required propellants to the thrusters and for
providing re-pressurization of the main engine propellant tanks and for
providing propellants for the fuel cell and for the main engine idle
mode start sequence.
While it was assumed that monitoring and detection equipment would be
required in this system, the analysis does not consider the success
probability of these items nor does it consider the success probability
of any of the supporting avionic equipment.
The criticality numbers were determined for each critical item of
each system. The criticality number of a component denotes the number
of mission failures in one million missions due to loss of that component°
The loss probability for one mission can be determined by multiplying the
criticality number by i0 -_.
The current Space Tug is defined in Reference i.
GROUNDRULESANDASSUMPTIONS
The following ground rules and assumptions were used in the performance
of this analysis:
(I) All lines and fittings are brazed and will not leak at the
connections without a structural failure.
(2) External leakage past the main engine inducer and turbopump
seals is negligible.
(3) Loss of engine idle moderesults in loss of the engine function.
(4) All propellant is dumpedprior to redocking.
(5) The main engine has isolation valves for the feed lines.
(6) The APShas "thruster out" capability and can perform its mission
with one thruster pod disabled.
(7) The system has adequate sensing devices to monitor critical
functions and to detect malfunctions.
(8) All valves are "fail safe" in their normal position.
(9) The main engine propellant tanks cannot be re-pressurized from
the main engine.
_le fill and drain disconnects were analyzed as independent components
although they were assumedto be part of an umbilical plate.
Loss of LH2 and LO2 multilayer insulation (MLI) purge after launch
has no effect on the immediate Tug mission.
Loss of LH2 and LO2 tank purge after the Tug returns for redocking
creates a hazardous condition.
The following time phases were used in this analysis:
(io)
(ii)
(12)
(13)
Phase B 136 hours
Phase A Boost and separation of 2.85 hours
Tug and Shuttle
Tug orbital operations and
redocking with Shuttle
Phase C Tug repressurization and 16.7 hours
return to Earth
CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS
The predicted probability of the Space Tug Propulsion System performing
for the duration of the Tug mission is 0.969189.
It is recommendedthat sufficient monitoring and malfunction detection
devices be included in the design to assure that redundant systems
will be effectively triggered in the event of failure.
More detailed recommendationsare included in the analyses of the
individual systems where it is deemedappropriate.
3
MAINENGINESYSTEMFAILUREMODE,
EFFECTSANDCRITICALITYANALYSIS
This section presents a preliminary failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis of the Space Tug Main Engine System. This system utilizes
a high performance LO2/LH2 engine having a nominal specific impulse
of 470 seconds and a thrust of i0,000 pounds. A staged-combustion
cycle with two preburners in conjunction with coaxial injectors and
a nozzle area expansion ratio of 400 is used for high efficiency.
The engine has throttle capability to 20 percent and mixture ratio
range of 5.5 to 6.5 (6.0 is nominal). No propellants are dumped
non-propulsively and a pressure-fed idle modeis utilized for engine
chilldown prior to start. The engine is equipped with boost pumps
for both propellants which allow NPSH'sof 15 feet for LH2 and
2 feet for LOXwithout penalty to the main pumps° The nozzle is
non-retractable.
The system schematic and the system block diagram are presented in
Figures i and 2, respectively.
ASSUMPTIONSAND GROUND RULES
i. External leakage past the inducer and turbopump seals is negligible.
2. Loss of engine idle mode results in loss of the engine.
3. All lines and fittings are brazed and will show no appreciable leakage
without a structural failure of these components.
4. The following time phases were used for this analysis:
Phase A Boost and separation of 2.85 hours
Tug and Shuttle
Phase B Tug orbital operations and 136 hours
redocking with Shuttle
Phase C Tug repressurization and 16.7 hours
return to earth
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The predicted probability of this system performing for the duration of a
Tug mission is 0.993767.
This analysis did not disclose any areas where a design change would
contribute significantly to the reliability of the system.
ENGINESYSTEM
CRITICALITEMSLIST
COMPONENT
CODE
501
5O2
Ln
5O3
5O4
5O5
506
507
508
510
ITEM
Main LH 2 Valve
Main LOX Valve
LH 2 Inducer
LOX Inducer
Preburner Control Valve
LH 2
Preburner Control Valve
LOX
LH 2 Turbopump
Preburner (2 req'd)
LOX Turbopump
FAILURE TYPE
Fails to open/remain open
External leakage
Fails to open/remain open
External leakage
Fails to operate/remain
in operation
Fails to operate/remain
in operation
Fails to open
Fails to open
Fails to close/remain closed
and internal leakage
Fails to operate/remain in operation
Fails to operate/remain in operation
Fails to operate/remain in operation
CRITICALITY
125
66
125
66
i
125
7
1360
2990
1360
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FIGURE 2. SHUTTLE TUG ENGINE SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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ComponcnC Identificac_on
Component Code: 501
Main LH 2 Valve
This normally closed pneumatically
operated poppet valve is opened and
closed to control LH 2 flow to the
engine. It is assumed that the
valve poppet will relieve any
pressure caused by fuel entrapment
between this valve and the preburner
FAILUIU¢ FkODE EFFI_CTS ,'O{ALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fails to open
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
Internal leakage
Fails to remain
open
A .
B.
C .
A .
B.
No effect. Not required to
operate during this phase.
Actual Loss
Unable to operate the
engine as required.
No 4ffect. Not required to
operate during this phase.
Not applicable. Valve is
closed during this phase.
No effect. Redundancy is
provided by downstream
valves.
C. No effect. Valve is closed
during this phase.
A, B, C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
downstream valves.
A. No effect. The valve is
not open during this phase.
Failure Effc¢= ca Vchlclc,
A.
B.
C .
A o
B •
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
Actual Loss
Inability to operate the
tug main engine causes
loss of the tug mission.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A, B, C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
i
FAILURE _K)DE EFFECTS 2_N.kLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
ENGINE S_S'rEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 501
Main LH 2 Valve (Continued)
Failure Mode
External leakage
Failure Effect on Syste_n
B. Actual Loss
Unable to operate the
engine as required.
C •
Ao
No effect. The valve is
not open during this phase.
Possible Loss
Hydrogen leaks into the
Shuttle bay area.
B.
C.
No effect. The amount of
leakage past the valve seals
will not affect the system.
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
B •
C .
A .
B.
C_
Failure Effect en Vehicle,
>!(_,'fnn a Cr,"_"
Actual Loss
Inability to operate the
tug main engine causes
loss of the tug mission.
Also, premature closure
of this valve could cause
a LOX rich shutdown
damaging the engine.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
Possible Loss
Accumulation of hydrogen
in the shuttle bay is a
hazard to the mission,
vehicle, and crew.
No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS #_NALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
ENGINE SYS'rEM
I Failure Effcdt ca Vehicle,
Componcnt Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on Syste_n
Component Code:
Main LOX Valve
502
Fails to open A. No effect. Not required to
This normally closed pneumatically
operated poppet valve is opened and
closed to control LOX flow to the
engine. It is assumed that the valve
poppet will relieve any pressure
caused by oxidizer entrapment in
the engine
Be
operate during this phase.
Actual Loss
Unable to operate the
engine as required.
C. Not applicable. Valve is
closed during this phase.
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
internal leakage
Fails to remain
open
A. Not applicable. Valve is
closed during this phase.
B. No effect. Redundancy is
provided by downstream
valves.
C. No effect. Valve is closed
during this phase.
A, B, C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided by
downstream valves.
A. No effect. The valve is
not open during this phase.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
B.
C .
A .
B.
Actual Loss
Inability to operate the
tug main engine causes
loss of the tug mission.
No effect Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A, B, C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
FAILURE I,_DE EFFECTS AN.\LYSIS
o,_ SPACE TUC MrSS_ON
ENGINE ..... sYS'rE,_
Component Identification
Component Code: 502
Main LOX Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 503
LH$ Inducer
Thls pump increases the tank inlet
pressure for engine idle mode and
main pump NPSH. The pump is oper-
ated by gaseous hydrogen tapped from
the engine bell.
Failure Mode
External leakage
Fails to operate
Failure Effect on System
B. Actual Loss
Unable to operate the
engine as required.
C.
A ,
No effect. The valve is
not open during this phase.
Possible Loss
Oxygen leaks into the
Shuttle bay area. •
B.
C ®
No effect. The amount of
leakage past the valve
seals will not effect the
system.
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
A*
B.
No effect. Not required
to operate in this phase.
Actual Loss
Loss of the engine main
pump NPSH.
B °
C °
A .
B,
C .
A .
B.
Failure Effect e'_ VchLcle)
Actual Loss
Inability to operate the
tug main engine causes
loss of the tug mission.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable
Possible Loss
Accumulation of oxygen
in the Shuttle bay is
hazardous to the crew,
vehicle, and mission.
No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect, Failure mode
not applicable.
Probable Loss
Loss of main pump NPSH
may preclude engine start
FAILUKE _g)DE EFFECTS ,_NALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
ENGINE SYST_,_
Componcnt Identification
Component Code: 503
LH 2 Inducer (Continued)
Fai lure "Mode Failure Effect on 'siena
Fails to remain
in operation
Internal or
external leakage
C. No effect. Not required
to operate in th phase.
A. No effect. Not required
to operate in th phase.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of engine main pump
NPSH.
Co
A.
B°
C.
No effect. Not required to
operate in this phase.
No effect. The main engine
valve is closed _reventing
leakage in this phase.
No effect, The amount of
leakage past the pump seals
will not affect the system.
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
Failure Effect ca Vehicle,
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
B. Possible Loss
Loss of main pump NPSH
may preclude engine
restart or cause a
premature shutdown.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
B. No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
FAILUILEr )DEFFECTS#_NALYSIS
oNsPAcgrugM[ss_0a
ENGINE SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 504
LOX Inducer
This pump increases the tank inlet
pressure for engine idle mode and
main pump NPSH. The pump is
operated by gaseous hydrogen tapped
from the engine bell.
Failure Mode
Fails to operate.
Fails to remain
in operation
External
leakage
Failure Effec= on System
No effect. Not required
operate in this phase.
Actual Loss
Loss of the engine main
pump NPSH.
No effect. Not required
to operate in this phase.
No effect. Not required to
operate in this phase.
Actual Loss
Loss of engine main pump
NPSH.
No effect. Not required
to operate in this phase.
No effect. The main engine
valve is closed preventing
leakage in this phase.
No effect. The amount of
leakage past the pump seals
will not affect the system.
Failure Effe¢= on Vehicle,
A.
B °
C.
A.
B.
C .
A.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
Probable Loss
Loss of main pump NPSH
may preclude engine start
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
Possible Loss
Loss of main pump NPSH
may preclude engine
restart or cause a
premature engine
shutdown.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
B. No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible
Component Identification
Component Code: 504
LOX Inducer (Continued)
Component Code: 505
Preburner Control Valve
(LH-) 2 Required
Thi_ valve is opened to allow LH 2
to enter the preburner at start.
FAILURE MODE EFFIICTS AN.\LYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
__ SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Internal
leakage
Fails to open
C •
A.
B.
C ,
A.
B.
C .
Failure Effect on Syste_n
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
No effect. The main engine
valve is closed preventing
leakage in this phase.
No effect. A helium purge
of the pump seals prevents
H 2 and 02 from bleeding
into the same cavity.
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
No effect. The valve
remains closed during this
phase.
Actual Loss
Unable to operate the
engine during this phase.
No effect. The valve
remains closed during this
phase.
Failure Effect c:_ Vehicle,
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
B. No effect. A purge
protects the engine from
seal failures.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
B.
C ,
Actual Loss
Loss of the tug engine
causes a loss of the tug
mission.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
FAILURE _E)DE EFFECTS ;_N_XLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
___ SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 505
Preburner Control Valve (Continued)
Failure Mode
Fai_s to close
Fails to remain
closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Failure Effect on System
A. No effect. The valve is
closed during this phase.
B. No effect. Hydrogen leaks
overboard. However,
redundancy is provided by
the main valve.
C. No effect. The valve is
closed during this phase.
A & C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided by
upstream components.
B. No effect. Some LH 2 is
lost overboard. However,
redundancy is provided by
the main valve.
A . No effect. Redundancy is
provided by upstream
components.
B. No effect. Leakage past
the valve seals is
negligible.
C. No effect. The LH^ tanks
are purged before _his
phase.
Failure Effc¢= on Vehicle,
A .
B.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A & C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided.
B. No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
A. No effect. Redundancy is
provided.
B. No effect.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
O_
FAILURE _KODE EFFECTS _'_N_LLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
ENGINE sYsfE,_
Component Identification
Component Code: 506
Preburner Control Valve
Failure Mode
Fails to open
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect. The valve
(LOX) 2 Required
This valve is opened to allow LOX
to enter the preburner at start.
During engine operation the valve
is modulated by inputs from the
engine control package to control
the engine mixture valve.
remains closed during this
phase.
B. Actual Loss
Unable to operate the
engine during this phase.
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
internal leakage
A & C. No effect. The valve
remains closed during, this
phase.
B, Actual Loss
Unable to control the
engine mixture ratio as
required.
A & C. No effect. Redundancy
is provided by upstream
components.
B, Actual Loss
Loss of engine mixture
ratio control.
Fail_re Effc¢= cn Vehicle°
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
B . Actual Loss
Loss of the tug engine
causes a loss of the tug
mission.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
B. Probable Loss
Loss of the mixture ratio
control can lead to
improper performance with
resultant loss of mission.
A & C. No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
B . Possible Loss
Loss of engine mixture
ratio control can lead to
improper performance with
resultant loss of mission,
FAILUREMODEEFFECTS#_N.%LYSIS
ONS_ACe_¢ MrssION
ENGINE S_S';EM
Componcn_ IdentifLcat_on
Component Code: 506
Preburner Control Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 507
LH_ Turbopump
(3Zstage)
Hydrogen from the pump flows around
the nozzle and combustion chamber
where it is vaporized. The
gaseous hydrogen is then used to
drive the LH 2 and LOX inducers and
provide fuel for preburner and main
engine operation.
Failure Mode
External leakage
Fails to operate
Fails toremain
in operation
Fa£1ure Effec_ on System
A.
m.
C.
No effect. The main
engine valve is closed
preventing leakage in
this phase.
No effect. Leakage past
the valve seals is
negligible.
No effect. The LOX tanks
are purged before thi6
phase.
A & C. No effect. Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of engine operation.
!A & C. No effect. Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of tug engine
operation.
Failure Effc¢= c:_ vehicle,
A. No effect.
B. No effect.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of engine causes loss
of tug mission.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
BJ Actual Loss
Loss of tug engine
operation causes loss of
tug mission.
OO
FAILURE _DE EFFECTS #_ALYSIS
ON SPACe TU¢ MISSION
ENGINE SYSTEM
Failure Effec: ca Vehicle,
Component Identification Failure _de Failure Effect on System >_i_!,_n_ Cr."_
External leakage
Component Code: 507
LH 2 Turbopump (Continued)
5O8Component Code:
Preburner
2 Required
These concentric element preburners
burn LH 2 and LOX in a very fuel-rich
environment to provide power to
run the turbopumps.
Fails to operate
Fails to remain
in operation
A .
B.
C .
No effect. Redundancy
provided by upstream
components.
No effect. Leakage past
the pump seals will not
affect the system.
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
A & C. No effect. Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of either preburner
would cause loss of the
engine.
A & C. No effect. Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of either preburner
would cause loss of the
engine.
A. No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
B. No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible.
C. No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of the engine would
cause loss of the tug
mission.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of the engine would
cause loss of the tug
mission.
FAILURE_DDEFFECTS;_X.XLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
ENGINE SYSTEM
Component Identlfic_tlon
Component Code: 508
Preburner (Continued)
Failure ,Mode
External leakage
Fa£1ure Effect on System
A, No effect, Redundancy is
Component Code: 509
Heat Exchanger (LOX)
This heat exchanger converts LOX
to GOX for pressurization of
the main LOX tank.
Component Code: 5 i0
No Applicable
Failure Type
provided by upstream
components,
Bo No effect, Leakage past
the seals would not affect
the system,
Co No effect, The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase,
LOX Turbopump
This turbopump increases the
oxygen pressure for main engine
and preburner operation,
Fails to oPerate A & C, No effect, Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B, Actual Loss
Loss of engine operation.
Failure Effec= on Vehicle,
A, No effect, Redundancy
is provided.
B.
C .
No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible,
No effect, Failure mode
not applicable.
A & C, No effect, Failure
mode not applicable,
B° Actual Loss
Loss of engine causes loss
of tug mission,
_o
o
Com?onent Identiflcation
Component Code: 510
LOX Turbopump (Continued)
Component Code: 511
Spark Igniter
This igniter provides ignition
for the engine.
FAILUIU_ }K)DE EFFECTS ;_NALYSiS
o._SPAC_ rug MZSS_O,_
ENGINE sYs';z_
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
in operation
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect. Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B.
External leakage
Fails to Operate
A.
B.
Actual Loss
Loss of engine operation.
Co
No effect. Redundancy
is provided by upstream
components. °
No effect. Leakage past
the pump seals will not
affect the system.
No effect. The propellants
are dumped prior to this
phase.
A & C. No effect. Not
required to operate during
this time phase.
B. No effect. There are two
igniters that are
redundant for fails to
operate.
Failure El:co= cn Vehicle,
vi_Ion_ Cr,'u
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of engine causes
loss of tug mission.
A .
B.
C.
No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
No effect. Leakage past
the seals is negligible.
No effect. Failure mode
not applicable.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable.
No effect. Redundancy
is provided.
B.
PNEUMATIC AND MLI VENT AND BACKFILL SYSTEM FAILURE MODE
EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
This section presents a preliminary failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis of the Space Tug Pneumatic and MLI Vent and Backfill System.
This system provides ambient helium for main engine and multilayer
insulation (MLI) purge, and for pneumatic valve and docking latch
activation.
The system schematic and the system block diagram are presented in
Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
ASSUMPTIONS AND GROUND RULES
io All lines and fittings have brazed connections and will show no
appreciable leakage without a structural failure of these components.
, Loss of the LH 2 and LOX tank multilayer insulation (MLI) purge after
launch has no effect on the in_nediate tug mission. However, the MLI
may be contaminated during reentry and would have to be replaced
before the next mission.
• Loss of LH 2 and LOX tank purge capability after the tug returns to
the Shuttle creates a hazardous condition and a decision concerning
tug return will be required at that time.
. The following time phases were used in this analysis:
Phase A Boost and Separation of
Tug and Shuttle
2.85 hours
Phase B Tug orbital operations and 136 hours
redocking
Phase C Tug repressurization and 16.7 hours
return to Earth
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The predicted probability of this system performing for the duration of
a Tug mission is 0.994755.
This analysis did not disclose any areas where a design change would
contribute significantly to the reliability of the system.
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PNEUMATICSYSTEM
CRITICALITEMSLIST
_O
_O
COMPONENT
CODE
402
403
404
405
406
407
4O8
409
410
ITEM
Quick Disconnect
Filter
N. C. Solenoid Valve
N. C. Solenoid Valve
N. C. Solenoid Valve
Helium Sphere
Filter
Regulator
Solenoid Latching Valve
FAILURE TYPE
Fails to disconnect
Fails to connect
Clogs
Fails to open
Fails to close/remain
closed, internal and
external leakage
Fails to close/remain
closed, internal and
external leakage
Fails to close/remain
closed, internal and
external leakage
Burst
Clogs
Regulates high
Regulates low
Fails to open/remain open
External leakage
CRI TICALITY
28.5
27.2
5.5
4.1
694.5
778.0
778.0
12.0
51.4
13.6
17.0
137.0
2.0
_o
_o
COMPONENT
CODE
411
412
413 a-n
413 p
413 r
413 s
ITEM
Plenum
Relief Valve
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
(Concluded)
FAILURE TYPE
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
Burst
Fails to close/remain closed
internal and external leakage
External leakage
Fails to open/remain open
External leakage
Fails to open/remain open
External leakage
Fails to open/remain open
External leakage
CRITICALITY
136.8
684.4
190.4
625.6
8.0
625.6
8.0
625.6
8.0
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FAILURE_DEEFFECTSAN._YSISONSPACETUGMISSION
SYSTEM
ComponentIdentification
COMPONENT CODE : 401
Quick Disconnect
This quick disconnect provides
a connection from the GSE
helium supply to the shuttle
payload bay.
COMPONENT CODE: 4@2
Quick Disconnect
This quick disconnect
provides a connection between
the shuttle payload bay and
the tug.
Failure Mode
Fails to
disconnect
Fails to
disconnect
Failu.re Effect on System
A, B, & C) No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
A) Actual loss.
Loss of system due to
inability to separate
from shuttle.
B C) No effect.
Not required to perform
this function during
this time phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A, B, & C) No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
A)
B C)
Actual loss.
Loss of mission due to
inability to separate
from shuttle.
No effect.
Not required to perfor_
this function during
this time phase.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Mission, Crew
COMPONENT CODE: 402
Quick Disconnect (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 403
Fails to
connect
Filter
This filter removes
contaminants from the
ambient helium supply line.
Clogs
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
No effect.
Not required to perform
this function during
this time phase.
Actual loss.
Unable to purge tug
propellant tanks.
No effect.
Not required to perform
this function during
this time phase.
Actual loss.
Unable to replenish
the tug helium sphere.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
A)
B)
No effect.
Not required to perform
this function during
this time phase.
Possible loss.
Being unable to purge
the tug propellant tanks
creates a hazardous
condition to the shuttle
and crew.
C) No effect.
A)
B)
Possible loss.
Possible depletion of the
tug helium supply.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
_o
Go
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMLATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE: 403
Filter (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 404
N.Co Solenoid Valve
This N.C. solenoid valve shuts
off the ambient helium supply.
Fails to open
Fails to close,
remain closed,
internal
leakage and
external
leakage
c)
A)
B)
C)
A&B)
Failure Effect on System
Actual loss.
Unable to replenish the
tug helium sphere.
Actual loss.
Usable to replenish the
tug helium sphere.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
Actual loss.
Unable to replenish the
tug helium sphere.
Actual loss.
Loss of helium.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
c) Possible loss.
Possible depletion of
the tug helium supply.
A) Possible loss.
Possible depletion of
the tug helium supply.
B) No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
c) Possible loss.
Possible depletion of
the tug helium supply.
A&B) Actual loss.
Loss of helium causes
loss of pneumatic
valve control.
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 404
N.C. Solenoid Valve (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 405
N.C. Solenoid Valve
This N.C. solenoid valve
shuts off the L0X system
ground purge line.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
Fails to open
Fails to close,
remain closed,
internal
leakage and
external leakagei
C) Possible loss.
A,B&C)
A,B&C)
Loss of helium.
No effect.
Not required to
performthis
function during this
time phase.
Actual Loss.
Loss of helium.
c) Possible loss.
Loss of helium could
cause loss of pneumatic
valve control and loss
of tug propellant tank
purge capability.
A,B&C)
A,B&C
No effect.
Not required to
perform this
function during
this time phase.
Actual loss.
Loss of helium
results in loss of
pneumatic control
and tug propellant
tank purge
capability.
_o
O
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS _/_YSIS
ON SPACE _TG MISSION
SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE: 406
N.C. Solenoid Valve Fails to open
This N.C. solenoid valve shuts
off the LH 2 system ground
purge line.
COMPONENT CODE: 407
Helium Sphere
This sphere contains helium
at 4500 psia.
Fails to close
remain closed,
internal
leakage and
external
leakage
Burst
Failure Effect on System
A_ BaC) No effect.
Not required to
perform this
function during
this time phase.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of helium.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of helium and
probable damage to
surrounding hardware
including the LH 2
and LOX tanks.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B&C) No effect.
Not required to
perform this
function during
this time phase.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of helium
results in loss of
pneumatic control
and tug propellant
tank purge
capabilities.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Burst would cause,
at best, loss of
the tug and possibly
loss of the shuttle
(phases A and C
only).
Lo
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 408
Filter
This filter removes contaminants
from the pneumatic control and
purge helium supply line.
COMPONENT CODE: 409
Regulator
This regulator reduces the
4500 psia helium supply pressure
to 750 psia.
FAILURE F_DE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Clogs
Regulates high
A, B&C)
A C)
Regulates Low
Failure Effect on System
Actual loss.
Loss of helium
supply.
No effect.
Operation of valve i0
can keep the plenum
chamber within the
required pressure range.
B) Possible loss.
Possible depletion of
the on-board helium
supply due to action
of relief valve 412.
A, B&C) Possible Loss.
He$ium pressure
could drop below that
required for pneumatic
control.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of helium
supply results in
loss of pneumatic
control and tug
propellant tank
purge capabilitites
A&C) No effect.
B) Possible loss.
Depletion of the
oh-board helium supply
would cause loss of tug
A, B&C) Possible Loss.
Possible loss of
Tug mission due to
loss of pneumatic
control.
Lo
_o
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS fuNALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 410
Solenoid Latching Valve
This latching valve controls the
helium supply to the plenum
chamber.
Failure Mode
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of helium supply
for pneumatic controls
purge and docking and
latching.
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
_sion_ Crew
Possible loss.
Loss of venting
capability could result
in structural damage
to the propellant
tanks.
Actual loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control would cause
loss of tug.
Probable loss.
Loss of purge capability
would result in an
unsafe condition and the
tug would be brought
back at crew discretion.
Lo
Lo
Component Identif£cation
COMPONENT CODE: 410
Solenoid Latching Valve (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 411
Plenum Chamber
This plenum chamber suppresses
pressure surges in the helium
pneumatic line.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close,
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External leakage
Burst
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure.
If regulator 409
regulates high loss
of helium would resul_
Possible loss.
Loss of helium.
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
_!i_sion, Crew
No effect for single
failure.
Probable loss if
regulator 409
regulates high due tc
loss of helium.
Possible loss.
Loss of helium
could result in loss
of pneumatic control
Actual loss.
Burst of the plenum
chamber would cause
loss of the pneumatic
system.
A&B)
c)
Actual loss.
Loss of the pneumatic
system would cause loss
of the tug mission.
Probable loss.
Burst of the plenum
could damage the shuttl_
Lo
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
COMPONENT CODE : 412
Relief Valve
This relief valve prevents over-
pressurization in the pneumatic
system.
COMPONENT CODE: 413 a.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
This valve is one of fifteen
identical valves which control
pneumatically operated valves
in the feed, fill, drain, vent
and reentry purge system. This
valve and valve 413b control the
two in flight LH 2 vent and relief
valves.
Fails to open°
Fails to close/
remain closed
internal leakage
and external
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
A, B&C) No effect for single
failure.
Possible damage to
pneumatic system
hardware due to
overpre_surization
if regulator 409
regulates high.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure.
A C) No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
ML_s_,n, Crew
A, B&C) No effect for single
failure.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure results in
loss of the tug
mission.
A&C) No effect.
_o
L_
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 413 a.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (Cont.)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
Failure Effect on System
B) No effect for single
failure.
The inflight LH vent
• 2
and relief valves are
redundant for fails to
open.
A, B&C) No effect for single
failure.
Redundancy is provided
by parallel/ upstream
components.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure could
result in loss of
pneumatic control.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi_i_,n_ Crew
B) No effect for single
failure.
If valve 413b fails to
operate properly or if
the other vent and reliel
valve fails to open/
remain open this would
result in a loss of
ventingocapability
for the LH 2 tank.
A, B&C) No effect for
single failure.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control would
result in loss of
tug mission.
Lo
O_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUC MISSION
SYSTEM
Component Idcnt£f£cat£on
COMPONENT CODE : 413b.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
This valve operates in
conjunction with valve 413b.
Fa£1ure Mode
Fails to open/
remain open
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
A C)
A,B&C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
B) No effect for single
failure.
The inflight LH 2 vent
and relief valves are
redundant for fails to
open.
No effect for single
failure.
Redundancy is provided
by parallel/upstream
components.
FaLlure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi _s [on i Crev
A&C) No effect.
B) No effect for single
failure.
If valve 413b fails to
operate properly or if
the other vent and
relief valve fails to
open/remain open this
would result in a loss
of venting capability
for the LH 2 tank.
A,B&C) No effect for single
failure.
Lo
Component Ident£fLcatlon
COMPONENT CODE: 413b. (Cont.)
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
This valve operates in
conjunction with valve 413a.
COMPONENT CODE: 413 c or @.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
These valves control the two
inflight LOX vent and relief
valves.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
External leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure could
result in loss of
pneumatic control.
A&C)
B)
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
No effect for single
failure.
The inflight LOX vent
and relief valves are
redundant for fails to
open.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
ML_s [on_ Cre_
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control would
result in loss of
tug mission.
A&C) No effect.
B) No effect for single
failure.
Lo
O0
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 413c or d.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (Cont,)
COMPONENT CODE: 413 e or f.
Three-Way Solenoid Valves
These valves control the two
LH 2 tank vent and relief valves.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) NO effect for
single failure.
Redundancy is
provided by upstream
components.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure could cause
loss of pneumatic
control.
A&C) No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B&C) No effect for
single failure.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control would cause
loss of tug mission.
A&C) No effect.
LO
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE: 413 e or f.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 413 g or h.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
These valves control the two
LOX tank vent and relief valves.
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External leakage
Fails to open
Failure Effect on System
B) No effect for single
failure.
Loss of venting
capability if both valves
413e and 413f fail to
open.
A, B&C) No effect.
Redundancy is
provided by down-
stream components.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure could result
in loss of pneumatic
control.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
M[ ss[c_n Cre'w
B) No effect for single
failure.
Loss of venting
capability could cause
structural damage to
the LH 2 tank.
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control means loss
of tug mission.
A&C) No effect.
oComponent Idcntifieation
COMPONENT CODE: 413 g or ho
Three-Way Solenoid Valves (Cont.)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS AN,ILYS!S
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
B)
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure.
Loss of venting
capability if both valve_
413g and 413h fail to
open.
No effect.
Redundancy is
provided by down-
stream components.
Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure which could
result in loss of
pneumatic control.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B) No effect for single
failure.
Loss of venting
capability could cause
structural damage
to the LOX tank.
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control means loss
of tug mission.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 413 j or k.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
These valves control the two
LH 2 tank vent and relief valves.
Failure Mode
Fails to open/
remain open
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
A&C)
B)
A&C)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure.
Loss of venting
capability if both
valves 413j and 413k
fail to open.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
No effect.
Not required to perform
this function during
this time phase.
No effect.
Redundancy provided
by downstream components
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
A&C) No effect for single
failure.
B) No effect.
A&C) No effect.
B) No effect.
_O
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 413 j or k.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve ICont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 413 1 pr n. ,
Three-way solenoid valves
These valves control the two L0X
tank vent and relief valves°
Failure _ode
External
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
Fai|ure Effect on System
A, B&C)
AaC)
B)
AaC)
Possible Loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure could cause
loss of pneumatic
control.
No effect for single
failure.
Loss of venting
capability if both
valves 4131 and 413n
fail to open.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
No effect.
Not required to perfo_
this function during
this time phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control would
result in loss of
tug mission.
A&C) No effect for single
failure.
B) No effect.
A&C) No effect.
LO
Com-onent Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 413 1 or n.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 413 p.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
This valve controls the N.C.
LH 2 main tank feed line valve.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
External
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
B)
A, B&C)
A&C)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Redundancy is provided
by downstream components.
Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
pressure which could
cause loss of
pneumatic control.
No effect.
Not required to perform
this function during
this time phase.
Actual loss.
Loss of LH 2 to tug
engine.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi_s£on, Crew
B) No effect.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of pneumatic
control would result
in loss of tug
mission.
A&C) No effect.
B) Actual loss.
Loss of tug engine.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 413 p.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 413 r.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
This valve controls the tug
engine LH 2 feed line valve.
Failure Mode
Fails to close.
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) No effect•
Multiple redundancy
is provided.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressure.
A&C)
B)
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
Actual loss.
Loss of LH 2 to tug
engine
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
_i'_::[on, Crew
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressure results
in loss of
pneumatic control.
A&C) No effect.
B) Actual loss.
Loss of tug engine.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE l_G MISSION
_ SYSTEM
Component Identlflcat£on Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE: 413 r.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
(Cont.)
Fails to close/
COMPONENT CODE: 413 s.
Three-Way Solenoid Valve
This valve controls the tug
engine LOX feed line valve.
remain closed and
internal leakag_
External leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) No effect.
Multiple redundancy
is provided.
A, B&C) Possibie loss.
Loss of helium
pressure.
A C) No effect.
Not required to operate
during this time phase.
B)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Hi :;s[on I Crew
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C)
Actual loss.
Loss of LOX to tug
engine.
A C)
B)
PQssible loss.
Loss of helium
pressure results
in loss of
pneumatic control.
No effect.
Actual loss.
Loss of tug engine.
ComponentIdentification
COMPONENTCODE: 413 s. (Cont.)
Three-WaySolenoid Valve
COMPONENTCODE: 414
Check Valves
15 required
These check valves prevent
cryopumping of air while the tug
is on the ground.
There is one check valve
associated with each of the 15
three-way solenoid valves.
FAILUREMODEEFFECTSANALYSISONSPACETUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
N_ effect.
tiple redundancy
i_ provided.
Possible loss.
Lcss of helium
pressure.
No effect for single
failure.
Mu tiple redundancy
is provided.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mts_[on_ Crew
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressure results
in loss of
pneumatic control.
A, B&C) No effect.
-.j
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE:
Check Valves
15 required
414 (Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE: 415
N. C. Solenoid Valve
This valve controls the flow of
helium to the MLI on the LH 2
tank.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed,
internal
leakage and
external leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
No effect.
Not required to
perform this function
during this time
phase.
Actual loss.
Loss of MLI purge.
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
M[.;_ion_Cre_
No effect.
No effect.
Loss of MLI purge
after launch has no
effect on the
immediate tug
mission. However,
the MLI may be
contaminated
during reentry and
would have to be
replaced before the
next mission.
O0
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTE,_
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 415 (Cont.)
N. C. Solenoid Valve
COMPONENT CODE: 416
N. C. Solenoid Valve
This valve controls the flow of
helium to the MLI on the LH 2
tank.
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
A, B&C)Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Redundancy is
provided.
Possible loss.
Possible loss of
MLI purge.
Actual loss.
Loss of MLI purge.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C) No effect.
No effect on
immediate tug
mission.
A, B&C) No effect.
Loss of MLI purge
after launch has no
effect on the
immediate tug
mission. However,
the MLI may be
contaminated
during reentry and
would have to be
replaced before the
next mission.
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 416 (Cont.)
N. C. Solenoid Valve
COMPONENT CODE: 417
Orifice
This orifice provides the
proper flow and pressure to the
MLI on the LOX tank.
COMPONENT CODE: 418
Orifice
This orifice provides the
proper flow and pressure to
the MLI on the LH 2 tank.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
and internal
leakage
External
leakage
No applicable
failure type
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) No effect.
Redundancy is
provided.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Possible loss of
MLI purge.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
M[_[on, Crew
A, B&C) No effect.
A, B&C) No effect.
No effect on
immediate tug
mission.
OComponent Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 419
N. O. Solenoid Valve
This valve is cycled to
maintain the proper pressure in th_
MLI on the LH 2 tank.
COMPONENT CODE: 420
Check Valve
This check valve prevents back
flow to the MLI on the LH 2 tank.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to open/
remain open
Fails to close/
remain closed,
internal leakage
and external
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of MLI purge.
A, B&C) Possible loss.
Valve is normally
open. Failure to
close causes loss
of MLI purge.
A, B&C) Actual loss.
Loss of MLI purge
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
A, B&C) No effect.
No effect on the
immediate tug
mission.
A, B&C) No effect.
No effect on the
immediate tug
mission.
A, B&C) No effect.
No effect on the
immediate tug
mission.
L_
Component Identlf[¢at[on
COMPONENT CODE: 420 (Cont.)
Check Valve
COMPONENT CODE: 421
N. O. Solenoid Valve
This valve is cycled to maintain
the proper pressure in the MLI
on the LOX tank.
COMPONENT CODE: 422
Check Valve
This check valve prevents
backflow to the MLI on the LOX
tank.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed,
internal leakage
and external
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
Fails to close/
remain closed,
internal leakage
and external
leakage
Fails to open/
remain open
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
A, BaC)
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Redundancy is
provided by upstream
valve.
Actual loss.
Loss of MLI purge.
Possible loss.
Valve is normally
open. Failure to
close causes loss of
MLI purge.
Actual loss.
Loss of•MLl purge.
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission i Crew
No effect.
No effect.
No effect on the
immediate tug
mission.
No effect.
No effect on the
immediate tug
mission.
No effect.
No effect on the
immediate tug
mission.
k_n
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Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 422
Check Valve
(Cont.)
FAILURE. MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close/
remain closed
internal leakage
and external
leakage
A, B&C)
Failure Effect on System
A, B&C)No effect°
Redundancy is
provided by upstream
valve.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi_slon_ Cre_
No effect.
HYDROGENFEED,FILL, DRAIN,VENTANDREENTRY
PURGESYSTEMFAILUREMODE,EFFECTSANDCRITICALITYANALYSIS
This section presents a preliminary failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis of the SpaceTug Hydrogen Feed, Fill, Drain, Vent and Reentry
Purge System. This system performs the following functions:
(a) The feed system is comprised of the ducting and associated valving
which is required to route the propellants from the tank to the
engine system.
(b) The fill and drain lines are provided to allow the LH 2 tank to
be filled on the ground. Ground draining of propellants may be
accomplished through the fill line.
(c) The vent and relief system is provided to insure that tank pressures
are maintained within structural design limits during ground and
inflight operation.
(d) The reentry purge system provides conditioning of the main and APS
LH 2 tank for reentry by the use of a helium purge and pressurization
of the tanks.
The system schematic and the system block diagram are presented in Figures 5
and 6, respectively. Figure 7 presents the block diagram for the helium
reentry purge system.
ASSUMPTIONS AND GROUND RULES
, The quick-disconnects in the hydrogen feed, fill, drain, and vent
system are part of one umbilical plate. The quick-disconnect in the
helium reentry purge system is part of the same umbilical plate.
However, an analysis has been performed on each quick-disconnect as
if it were a single component.
2. There is no propellant in the LH 2 tank at time of redocking.
3. Engine cannot operate without proper operation of the idling mode.
4. There are valves within the engine which are not shown on the
schematic, but are used as isolation valves for the engine feed line.
5. Loss of mission means loss of Tug mission.
means loss of Space Shuttle crew and vehicle.
6. The following time phases were used in this analysis:
Phase A Boost and separation of
Tug and Shuttle
Phase B Tug orbital operations and
redocking with Shuttle
Phase C Tug repressurization and
return to Earth
Loss of crew and vehicle
2.85 hours
136 hours
16.7 hours
53
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
,
.
.
,
°
.
The predicted probability of no primary mission loss due to failure of
the hydrogen feed, fill, drain and vent system is 0.998585.
The predicted probability of no loss of the shuttle crew or vehicle
due to failure of the hydrogen feed, fill, drain and vent system is
0.999998.
The predicted probability of no primary mission loss due to failure
of the helium reentry purge system is 0.999200.
The predicted probability of no loss of the shuttle crew or vehicle
due to failure of the helium reentry purge system is 0.999994.
For some missions it is recommended that the helium reentry purge
supply be placed on the tug instead of in the shuttle payload bay.
This would reduce the criticality of the quick-disconnect involved
in this system.
It is recommended that a check valve be added between the reentry
purge valves (Component Code 116) and the oxygen system purge line.
This would provide added safety in the event of double failure of
internal leakage, and failure to remain closed. It is a preventative
measure to keep hydrogen and oxygen from mixing in the event of
internal leakage of purge valves.
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HYDROGENFEED,FILL, DRAIN,ANDVENTSYSTEM
CRITICALITEMSLIST
L_
Ln
COMPONENT
CODE
i01
102
104
I05
108
COMPONENT
Quick-Disconnect
i required
Quick-Disconnect
i required
Valve, Pneumatically
Operated, N.C.
2 required
Valve, Pneumatically
Operated, N.C.
i required
Solenoid Valve, N.O.
i required
FAILURE MODE
Fails to disconnect
Leakage
Fails to disconnect
Leakage
Fails to close
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Fails to open
Fai_s to remain open
External leakage
Fails to open
Fails to remain open
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
CRM
163.00
.82
163.00
.82
4.28
42.85
.21
77.50
77.50
.02
6.25
0.62
17.30
.02
CRC
.82
.82
.02
.01
.01
CRV
.82
.82
.02
.01
.01
L_
O_
COMPONENT
CODE
i09
ii0
iii
112
COMPONENT
HYDROGEN FEED, FILL, DRAIN, AND VENT SYSTEM
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
(Continued)
FAILURE MODE
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
i required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
i required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
2 required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
2 required
Fails to open
Fails to close
Fails to remain open
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Fails to close
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Fails to close
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
CRM
62.50
6.25
6.25
62.50
.O8
79 •80
.O8
3.46
34.60
.15
12.50
159.52
.15
CRC
.01
.01
.01
.01
CRV
.01
.01
.01
.01
Ln
-4
COMPONENT
CODE
113
114
106
116
COMPONENT
HYDROGEN FEED, FILL, DRAIN AND VENT SYSTEM
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
(Continued)
FAILURE MODE
Valve, Pneumatically
Operated, N.C.
2 required
Valve, Pneumatically
Operated, N.C.
i required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
i required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
2 required
Fails to close
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Fails to open and
remain open
External leakage
Fails to open and
remain open
Fails to close and
internal leakage
External leakage
External leakage
CRM
15.50
197.75
.21
155.00
.01
2.15
62.50
CRC
.02
.01
CRV
.02
.01
Final Totals: 1415.38 1.77 1.77
HELIUMREENTRYPURGESCHEI_ATIC
CRITICALITEMSLIST
L_
Oo
COMPONENT
CODE
317
318
320
321
COMPONENT
Quick-Disconnect
I required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
2 required
Sphere
2 required
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
i required
FAILURE MODE
Fails to connect
Fails to disconnect
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
External leakage
Burst
Fails to remain closed and
internal leakage
CRM
154.88
163.00
124.92
.13
277.70
79.80
CRC
6.02
CRV
6.02
Final Totals: 800.43 6.02 6.02
FIGURE5. HYDROGENFEED,FILL, DRAIN,VENTANDREENTRYPURGESCHEMATIC
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FIGURE 7. HELIUM REENTRY PURGE SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: i01
Quick Disconnect
1 required
This quick disconnect with
check valve provides connection
to the payload bay of the space
shmttle orbiter. It enables
filling and draining of the
main and APS LH 2 tanks.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to connect
Fails to
disconnect
Failure Effect on System
A) No effect.
Quick disconnect is
not required to connect
during this time.
B) No effect,
The LH_ tank will be
draine_ before
redocking.
C) No effect.
Quick disconnect is not
required to connect
during this time.
A) Actual loss.
System cannot be
disconnected from shuttle
orbiter.
B & C) No effect.
Quick disconnect is not
required to disconnect
during this time.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) Actual loss.
Tug cannot leave
orbiter to carry out
assigned mission.
B & C) No effect.
Not applicable.
Lo
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
COMPONENT CODE: i01
Quick Disconnect (Cont)
COMPONENT CODE : 102
Quick Disconnect
i required
This quick disconnect with
check valve provides
connection to the payload bay
of the space shuttle orbiter.
It enables venting of GH 2.
Leakage
Fails to
connect
A)
B)
C)
A)
Possible loss.
System could be lost due
to loss of hydrogen into
payload bay.
No effect.
Upstream valves can shut
off pressure to line,
and hydrogen leaks only
into space.
No effect.
Leakage is not applicable
since LH 2 tank will be
drained prior to
redocking°
No effect.
Quick disconnect is not
required to connect
during this time.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) Possible loss.
Escape of hydrogen into
payload bay could cause
loss of tug mission,
and could create a
hazard to the shuttle
crew.
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
o_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE: 102
Quick Disconnect (Cont)
Fails to
disconnect
B)
C)
A)
Failure Effect on System
POssible loss.
Loss of capability to
vent GH 2 from the tank
would mean that the
reentry heliumpurge
could not take place.
No effect.
Quick disconnect is not
required to connect
during this time.
Actual loss.
System cannot be
disconnected from shuttle
orbiter.
B & C) No effect.
Quick disconnect is not
required to disconnect
during this time.
B)
C)
A)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
Possible loss.
Vehicle cannot be made
safe for reentry with
residual hydrogen
aboard.
No effect.
Not applicable.
Actual loss.
Tug cannot leave orbiter
to carry out assigned
mission.
B & C) No effect.
Not applicable
L_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE : 102
Quick Disconnect (Cont)
Leakage A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on System
Possible loss.
System could be lost due
to loss of hydrogen into
payload bay.
No effect.
Upstream valves can
shut off pressure in line,
and hydrogen leaks only
into space.
No effect.
GH^ leakage would be
Z
negligible, and would be
diluted by helium.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) Possible loss.
Escape of hydrogen into
payload bay could cause
loss of tug mission,
and could create a
hazard to the shuttle
crew.
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
Componentidentification
COMPONENTCODE: 103
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 required
These valves are used to
provide on-off c_pability to
two non-propulsive nozzles for
venting of the LH2 tanks
during flight of the space
tug. They are pneumatical_y
operated valves which remain
in the last commandedposition°
They are redundant for failure
to open, and failure to
remain open. The valves also
provide venting for flow of
hydrogen from the APStank
through the heat exchanger
for main tank propellant
conditioning.
FAILUREMODEEFFECTSANALYSISONSPACETUGMISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to open A)
B)
C)
Failu Effect on System
No effect.
Valw is not required
to o)en during this time.
No effect for single
faill
If both valves fail
to open, venting of the
LH2 tank during tug
flight cannot be
achi¢
No effect.
Valw is not required
to open during this time.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B)
C)
No effect for single
failure.
Preconditioning of
main tank propellants
cannot take place
without proper in-
orbit venting. Loss
of tug mission could
occur in the event of
double failure.
No effect.
Not applicable.
-.j
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 103
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Cont)
Failure Mode
Fails to close
Fails to remain
open
A)
I B)
C)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect.
Valve is not required
to close during this
time.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure would
cause loss of venting.
Flow through LH 2 heat
exchanger would be
stopped, and liquid
could not be maintained
at the engine interface.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect for single
failure.
Double failure could
cause premature loss of
venting, causing
possible loss of tug
mission.
o_
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Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 103
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Cont.)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fails to remain
closed and
leakage
¢) No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
A)
B)
No effect for single
failure.
If upstream valve fails
to remain closed also,
hydrogen will escape
into payload bay. This
double failure would
cause loss of system.
No effect.
Valve is not required to
remain closed since
venting must be provided
for flow of GH 2 through
hydrogen heat exchanger.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
M_ssion, Crew
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect for single
failure.
Double failure causes
leakage of hydrogen
into payload bay
creating a h_zard to
shuttle crew and mission
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
O_
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS A_NALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 103
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Cont.)
COMPONENT CODE:_ 104
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.C.
2 required
These valves provide on-off
capability to the GH vent line.2
Before orbital operations
begin, GH 2 will be vented
through one of these valves
from the main propellant tank.
The valve will also be used
to vent the main tank during
the reentry purge process.
Failure Mode
Fails to open
Failure Effect on System
c) No effect for single
failure.
If upstream valve fails
to remain closed also,
helium pressurization
would be lost and tank
could collapse during
reentry.
A) No effect for single
failure.
Double failure causes
inability to vent
through GH 2 vent line.
B) No effect.
Valve is not required
to open during this
time.
c)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure could
cause loss of tug
mission.
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure may
cause pressure in tank
to exceed structural
limits.
No effect.
Not applicable.
-.j
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Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 104
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.C. (Cont.)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fails to close
c)
A)
B)
C)
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure causes
inability to purge
residual hydrogen gas
from tank.
Actual Loss
The GH 2 vent line
not be shut off, and
venting could not be
stopped.
could
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
Actual loss.
Helium pressurization
will be lost.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
c) No effect for
single failure.
Double failure would
cause inability to
make vehicle safe for
reentry.
A)
B)
Possible loss.
Inability to stop
venting may cause
sufficient propellant
loss for loss of tug
mission.
No effect.
Not applicable.
c) Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause main tank to
collapse during
reentry°
..........i"
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Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: I04
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.Co (Cont.)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
_/L_[__SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
open
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure would
cause premature shut-
off of LH 2 venting.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect for single
failure.
A double failure of
premature closing of
valve would prohibit
complete residual gas
purge.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A)
B)
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure could
cause pressure in
tank to exceed
structural limits.
No effect.
Not applicable.
c) No effect for single
failure.
Double failure could
cause inability to
make vehicle safe
for reentry.
_o
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 104
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.C. (Cont.)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to remcin
closed and
internal
leakage
Failure Effect on System
A)
B)
C)
Possible loss.
Premature venting could
cause excessive loss of
hydrogen,
No effect for single
failure.
Redundancy is provided
by check valve in quick-
disconnect. Double
failure would cause loss
of hydrogen to space.
Actual loss.
Helium pressurization
would be lost.
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
Possible loss.
Loss of hydrogen
could cause loss of
tug mission.
No effect for single
failure.
Double failure could
cause loss of tug
mission due to
excessive hydrogen loss.
Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry.
Lo
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 104
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.C. (Cont.)
Failure Mode
External
Leakage
Failure Effect on System
A) Possible loss.
System could be lost due
to loss of hydrogen.
B) Possible loss.
System could be lost due
to loss of hydrogen.
C) Possible loss.
Helium pressure could be
lost.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) Possible loss.
Escape of hydrogen
could cause loss of tug
mission, and could
create a hazard to the
shuttle crew.
B) Possible loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of propellant
causing loss of tug
mission.
c) Possible losso
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause main tank to
collapse during
reentry.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 105
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.C.
I required
This valve provides on-off
capability between the LH 2 tank
and the engine feed line.
Failure Mode
Fails to open
Fails to close
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is not required
to open during this time
Actual loss.
Liquid hydrogen cannot
be supplied to engine.
No effect.
Valve is not required
to open during this
time.
No effect.
Valve is closed
throughout this time.
No effect for single
failure.
Redundancy is provided
by downstream valve. In
the event of double
failure, hydrogen will
bleed through engine.
No effect.
Valve is closed
throughout this time.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B)
C)
A)
r
B)
C)
Actual loss.
Inability to feed LH 2
to engine causes loss
of tug mission.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect for single
failure.
Hydrogen bleed in the
event of a double
failure will not
affect tug.
No effect.
Not applicable.
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE= 105
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N.C. (Cont.)
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
open.
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
A)
B)
C)
A)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is closed
throughout this time.
Actual loss.
Engine would be
prematurely shut off.
No effect.
Valve is closed
throughout this time.
No effect.
Redundancy is provided
by downstream valve, and
valves within engine.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) Actual loss.
Engine shut-off would
cause loss of tug
mission.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
"-4
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 105
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
N.C. (Cont.)
Failure Mode
External
leakage
B)
C)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is not required
to remain closed during
this time° Engine is in
operation.
No effect.
Redundancy is provided by
downstream valve, and
valves within engine.
Possible loss.
System could be lost
due to loss of
hydrogen.
No effect.
Valve is open during
this time, and hydrogen
leakage into space is not
critical.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A)
8)
Possible loss.
Escape of hydrogen could
cause loss of tug missior
and could create a hazard
to the shuttle crew.
No effect.
Not applicable.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 105
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
107
N. C. (Cont)
COMPONENT CODE:
Orifice
i required
This orifice controls the
flow of hydrogen from the
APS tank through the heat
exchanger for proper main
tank propellant conditioning.
Failure Mode
c)
No applicable
failure modes
Failure Effect on System
Possible loss.
Helium pressure could
be lost.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
c) Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause main tank to
collapse during
reentry.
OO
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS /_NALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
COMPONENT CODE: 108
Soleno%d Valve, N.O.
1 required
This valve enables hydrogen
to pass from the APS tank and
through the heat exchanger
during tug orbital operations.
It remains open during tug_
orbital operations so that the
main tank propellant may be
properly conditioned. It will
be closed intermittently
during orbital operations while
the main and APS tanks are
being vented.
Fails to open
Fails to close
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
Actual loss,
Loss of flow'through
hydrogen heat exchanger
causes loss of main
tank propellant
conditioning process,
No effect.
Valve is not required
to open during this time°
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect.
Valve is not required to
close during this time.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
M[_fon_ Crew
A) No effect,
Not applicable°
B) Possible loss.
Engine may not function
properly due to improper
conditioning of main
tank propellant. This
could lead to loss of
tug mission.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
_D
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
|m,,
Fn_lure Effect on Vehicle,
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System _ss[on_ Crcv
Fails to remain
open
COMPONENT CODE: 108
Solenoid Valve, N.O.
i required
(Cont.)
Fails to remain
closed and
internal leakage
c)
A)
C)
A)
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
Actual loss.
Propellant conditioning
process would be lost.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
Actual loss.
Hydrogen would be
drained from APS tank.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B)
C)
Possible loss.
Inability to condition
main tank propellant
could cause loss of
tug mission.
No effect.
Not applicable.
A) Possible loss.
Hydrogen drainage from
APS tank could cause
loss of tug mission.
Oo
O
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Component Identlflcatlon Fallure Mode Failure Effect on System
COMPONENT CODE : 108
Solenoid Valve, N.O.
I required
i
(Cont.)
External leakage
B)
C)
A)
No effect.
Valve is open during
this time.
Actual loss.
Helium pressurization
would be lost from APS
tank.
Possible loss.
Excessive hydrogen
leakage could cause loss
of use of APS tank.
B)
C)
A)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi _ s [_n i Crew
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry,
Possible loss.
Excessive loss of
propellant could cause
loss of tug mission,
and leakage of hydrogen
into payload bay could
create a hazard to the
shuttle crew.
oo
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 108 (Cont.)
Solenoid Valve
COMPONENT CODE: 109
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
i required
This valve provides on-off
capability between the APS
tank and the engine. It is
opened so that the engine may
be placed in idle mode prior
to start of main tank feed.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Fallure Mode
Fails to open
Failure Effect on System
B)
C)
No effect.
Valve is open during
this time, and hydrogen
leakage into space is not
critical.
Possible loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of helium
pressurization.
A)
B)
No effect.
Valve is not required
to open during this time.
Actual loss.
Engine cannot be placed
in idle mode.
FaLlure Effect on Vehicle,
M_ss[on, Crew
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
c) Possible loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) Actual Loss
Inability to use idle
mode would prevent
starting of engine,
leading to loss of
mission.
0o
bo
FAILURI" MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 109
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
1 required
(Cont.)
Failure Mode
Fails to close°
Fails to remain
open
Failure Effect on System
c) No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
A)
B)
C)
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
Possible loss.
Inability to shut off idle
mode could cause excessive
hydrogen loss from the
APS tank.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
A) No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
c)
A)
B)
C)
A)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi_s[on_ Crew
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible loss.
Excessive loss Of
hydrogen from APS tank
could cause loss of
tug mission.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect.
Not applicable.
oo
Lo
FAILURE.MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 109 (Cont.)
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
i required
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
closed and
internal leakage
B)
C)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
Possible loss.
Premature closing of valve
would cause loss of engine
mode.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect°
Redundancy is provided
by downstream valve,
and by valves within
engine.
Possible loss.
Inability to shut off
idle mode could cause
excessive hydrogen loss
from the APS tank.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
MX_;s[on Crew
B) Possible loss.
Inability to use idle
mode could prevent
starting of engine,
leading to loss of tug
mission.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
8) Possible loss.
Excessive loss of
hydrogen from APS tank
could cause loss of
tug mission.
OO
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Co_ponent Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 109
Soleno%d Valve, N.C.
i required
Cont.)
Failure Mode
External leakage
c)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Redundancy is provided
by downstream valve,
andby valves within
engine.
Possible loss.
Excessive hydrogen
leakage could cause loss
of use of APS tank.
Possible loss.
Excessive hydrogen
leakage could cause loss
of use of APS tank.
Failure Effect on Vehlcle,
Mi_sIon_ Cre_
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A)
B)
Possible loss.
Excessive loss of
propellant could cause
loss of tug mission,
and leakage of hydrogen
into payload bay could
create a hazard to the
shuttle crew.
Possible loss.
Excessive loss of
propellant could cause
loss of tug mission.
co
Ln
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDRO GEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to ope n
and remain open
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: !i0
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
! required
This valve is used during ground
operations for filling the APS
LH 2 tank. It is also available
for use in case of abort dump
of tug propellants.
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
External
Leakage
Failure Effect on System
c) Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of helium
pressurization.
A, B, & C) No effect.
Valve is not required to
open after liftoff.
A, B, & C) No effect.
Valve is closed throughout
these times.
A & B) Possible Loss.
Propellant would be lost
from APS tank.
c) Possible Loss.
Helium pressurization
could be lost from APS
tank.
A) Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen
leakage causes loss of
Lil2 from APS tank.
c)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
Possible Loss
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry.
A, B, & C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A, B, & C) No effect°
Not applicable.
A & B) Possible Loss.
Excessive loss of
propellant from APS
tank could cause loss
of tug mission.
c) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry.
A) Possible Loss.
Leakage of APS propellant
could cause loss of tug
mission, and could creatc
a hazard to the shuttle
crew.
OO
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
]_-DROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Mission I Crew
COMPONENT CODE: II0
Solenoid Valve, N. C. (Contd)
c)
Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen leakage
causes loss of LH 2 from
APS tank.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage would
cause loss of helium
pressurization.
COMPONENT CODE: iii
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 required
Fails to open
and remain open
A) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
These valves provide on-off
capability to the GH 2 vent line.
Before orbital operations begin,
GH_ will be vented through these
valves from the APS tank. The
valves will also be used to vent
the APS tank during the reentry
purge process. They are
redundant for fails to open and
remain open.
causes inability to vent
through GH 2 vent line.
B)
C)
No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
causes inability to purge
residual hydrogen gas
from tank.
B)
C)
A)
B)
C)
Possible Loss.
Loss of APS propellant
would cause loss of
tug mission.
Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry.
No effect for single
failure. Double
failure may cause
pressure in tank to
exceed structural limits
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
would cause inability to
make vehicle safe for
reentry.
OO
Component Identification
DuOM_ONENT CODE: Iii
Solenoid Valve, N. C. (Contd)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
A)
B)
C)
A)
Failure Effect on System
B)
Actual Loss
The GH 2 vent line could
not be shut off, and
venting could not be
stopped.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
Actual Loss.
Helium pressurization
would be lost.
Possible Loss.
Premature venting could
cause loss of hydrogen.
No effect for single
failure. Redundancy is
provided by check valve
in quick-disconnect.
Double failure would cause
loss of hydrogen to space°
A)
B)
C)
A)
_)
Failure Effect on Veb.icle,
5_is sion_ Cre_
Possible Loss.
Inability to stop
venting may cause
sufficient propellant
loss for loss of tug
mission.
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause APS tank to
collapse during reentry.
Possible Loss.
Loss of hydroge n could
cause loss of tug
mission.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of tug
mission due to excessive
hydrogen loss.
Oo
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: iii
Solenoid Valve, N: C. (Contd)
External
leakage
Failure Mode
c)
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on System
Actual Loss.
Helium pressurization
would be lost.
Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen
leakage could cause loss
of system.
Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen
leakage could cause loss
of system.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of helium
pressurization.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
c) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause APS tank to
collapse during reentry.
A) Possible Loss.
Escape of hydrogen could
cause loss of tug
mission, and could
create a hazard to the
shuttle crew.
B) Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of propellant
causing loss of tug
mission.
c) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause APS tank to
collapse during reentry.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE _TG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 112
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 required
Failure Mode
Fails to open
and remain open
A)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is not required to
These valves provide on-off
capability to the LH 2 fill and
drain line for in-flight venting
of the APS tank during tug
orbital operation. They are
redundant for failure to open
and remain open.
open during this time.
B) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
causes inability to vent
during tug operation.
c) No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
A) No effect.
Valve is closed throughout
this time.
Possible Loss.
Inability to stop venting
could cause excessive
hydrogen loss.
c) No effect.
Valve is closed throughout
this time.
A & B) Possible Loss.
Inability to stop venting
could cause _xcessive
hydrogen loss.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause APS tank to
exceed structural limits
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen loss
from APS tank could
cause loss of tug
mission.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A & B) Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen loss
from APS tank could caus_
loss of tug mission.
_O
_O
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 113
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N. C., Position-lndicating
(Contd)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS _qALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
h_DROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
External
leakage
Failure Effect on System
A & B) Possible Loss.
Inability to stop venting
could cause excessive
hydrogen loss.
c)
A)
Possible Loss.
Inability to shut off fill
and drain line could cause
loss of helium
pressurization.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage of
hydrogen causes loss of
LH 2 from main tank.
B)
c)
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage of
hydrogen causes loss of
LH 2 from main tank.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage would
cause loss of helium
pressurization.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A & B) Possible Loss.
Excessive hydrogen loss
from main tank could
cause loss of tug
mission.
c) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause main tank to
collapse during reentry.
•A) Possible Loss.
Leakage of main tank
propellant could cause
loss of tug mission, and
could create a hazard to
the shuttle crew.
B) Possible Loss.
Leakage of main tank
propellant could cause
loss of tug mission.
c) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could
cause tank to collapse
during reentry.
Lo
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 114
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N. C.
i required
This valve provides on-off
capability between the main tank,
APS tank, and the engine. It must
be open for engine idle mode and
main engine operation.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to open
and remain open
Fails to close
Failure Effect on System
A)
B)
No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
Actual Loss.
Engine cannot operate.
c)
A)
B)
C)
No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
No effect.
Redundancy is provided by
upstream valve, and
valves within engine.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) Actual Loss.
Loss of tug engine
causes loss of tug
mission.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
%0
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
closed and
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 114
Valve, Pneumatically Operated,
N. C. (Contd)
internal
leakage
External
leakage
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Redundancy is provided _y
upstream valve, and val\
within engine.
No effect.
Valve is not required tc
remain closed during thJ
time.
No effect.
Redundancy is provided ly
upstream valve, and
valves within engine.
Possible Loss.
Leakage of hydrogen cou]
cause excessive loss of
propellant.
No effect.
Valve is open during thJ
time, and hydrogen leak_
only into space.
No effect for single
failure. Upstream valv_
would prevent leakage o_
helium except in the .ev_
of double failure.
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible Loss.
Leakage of hydrogen coul,
cause loss of tug
mission, and could
create a hazard to the
shuttle crew.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause tank to
collapse during reentry.
L_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 115
Nozzle
2 required
These are non-propulsive nozzles
which allow in-flight venting
during tug operations.
COMPONENT CODE: 106
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
i required
This valve is opened to enable
helium to enter the APS tank for
pressurization prior to reentry.
Failure Mode
No applicable
failure modes.
Fails to open
and remain open
A& B)
c)
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this tim'e.
Actual Loss.
APS tank cannot be
pressurized,
Fails to close A & B) No effect.
Valve is closed during
this time.
c) No effect.
Valves in the vent and
feed lines provide
redundancy.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
M_ ssion_ Crew-7
A & B) No effect.
Not applicable.
c) Possible Loss.
Inability to pressurize
APS tank could cause it
to collapse during
reentry.
A & B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 106
Solenoid Valve, N. C. (Contd)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ?_ALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
,,HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
External
leakage
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
C)
No effect.
Valves in the vent and feec
lines provide redundancy.
Possible Loss.
Hydrogen supply in APS
tank could be too rapidly
depleted.
No effect.
Valves in the vent and
feed line provide
redundancy.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause rapid depletion of
APS supply.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause rapid depletion of
APS supply°
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage would
cause APS helium
pressurization to be lost.
A)
B)
C)
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible Loss.
Loss of APS causes loss
of tug mission.
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible Loss.
Loss of APS supply causes
loss of tug mission, and
hydrogen leakage could
create a hazard to
shuttle crew.
Possible Loss.
Loss of APS supply could
cause loss of tug
mission.
Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could caus_
APS tank to collapse
upon reentry.
FAILUREr )DEFFECTSY_NALYSISONSPACETUGMISSION
HYDROGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fails to open
and remain open
COMPONENT CODE: 116
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 required
These valves provide on-off
capability between the LH 2 tanks,
and the reentry purge helium
system. They are opened to
allow the LH 2 tanks to be
pressurized with helium prior to
reentry. They are redundant
for failure to open and
remain open. Fails to close
Fails tO remain
closed and
internal
leakage
A & B) No effect.
Valves are closed during
this time.
c) No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail to open, helium
pressurization will be
lost.
A & B) No effect.
Valves are closed during
this time.
c) No effect for single
failure. Upstream valves
can shut off pressurizatio
Double failure causes loss
of system.
A) No effect for single
failure. Upstream valves
can shut off pressurizatiol
Double failure causes
premature pressurization.
Failure Effect on Vehiale,
A & B) No effect.
Not applicable.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
would lead to possibility
of tanks collapsing
during reentry.
A & B) No effect.
Not applicable.
c)
A)
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
of upstream valve would
lead to possibility of
tanks collapsing during
reentry.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause premature
pressurization, which
could lead to loss of
tug mission.
O0
Componcn_ Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 116
Solenoid Valve, N. C. (Contd)
FA_LU_ ,'_OX ZFFECTS ;_<.<L';SZS
OX S_AC_ r0¢ Hiss<ox
HYDROGEN S'_'SrEH
Failure Mode
External
leakage
Failure Effect on System
B)
c)
A)
No effect for single
failure. Check valve in
quick-disconnect provides
redundancy. Double
failure could cause loss
of hydrogen.
No effect for single
failure. Upstream valve
can shut off
pressurization. Double
failure causes loss of
pressurization.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of LH 2 supply.
B)
C)
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause hydrogen supply to
be rapidly depleted.
Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of helium
pressurization.
Failure Effect ca Vehicle,
B) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of tug
mission.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause tanks to
collapse during reentry.
A)
B)
C)
Possible Loss.
Loss of LH 2 supply causes
loss of tug mission, and
leakage could create a
hazard to shuttle crew.
Possible Loss.
Rapid hydrogen depletion
would cause loss of tug
mission.
Possible Loss.
Loss of helium
pressurization could cause
tanks to collapse during
.reentry.
Co=ponent Ident£flcac[on
COMPONENT CODE : 317
Quick-Disconnect
1 required
This quick disconnect with check
valve provides connection to the
payload bay of the space shuttle
orbiter. It enables the LH 2
tanks to be purged and pressurized
with helium prior to reentry.
FAILUIU']MODE EFF!:CTSANALYSIS
ON SPAC_ TUC M_SS[ON
__ SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to connect
Fails to
disconnect
Leakage
Failure Effect on Systeta
A) No effect.
Quick-disconnect is not
required to connect during
this time.
B) Actual Loss.
Inability to purge and
pressurize prior to reentry
would result.
c) No effect.
Quick-disconnect is not
required to connect during
this time.
A) Actual Loss.
System cannot be dis-
connected from shuttle
orbiter.
B & C) No effect.
Quick-disconnect is not
required to disconnect
during this time.
A) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of
hydrogen.
A)
B)
C)
Failure Zffcc= o:_Vehicle,
xq _,_ _ on, C r,"-"
No effect.
Not applicable.
Possible Loss.
Loss of purge and
pressurization causes
inability to make vehicle
safe for reentry.
No effect.
Not applicable
A) Actual Loss.
Tug cannot leave orbiter
to carry out assigned
mission.
B & C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause a hazard to
shuttle crew, and could
cause loss of tug mission.
O
O
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 317
Quick-Disconnect (Contd)
COMPONENT CODE: 318
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 required
These valves provide on-off
capability between the reentry
purge helium supply and the
purge line. They are opened in
order to purge and pressurize the
LH 2 tanks prior to reentry. They
are redundant for failure to open
and remain open.
FAILURE _DE EFFECTS f_ALYSIS
ON SeACE TU¢ MISSION
HELIUM SYSTE_
Failure Mode
Fails to open and
remain open
Fails to close
Failure Effect on System
B) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of
hydrogen.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
Could cause loss of helium
pressurization.
A & B) No effect.
Valves are not required to
open during this time.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
causes inability to use
helium purge system.
A & B) No effect.
Valves are closed during
this time.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of helium
purge system.
Failure Effcc= on VchLcle,
B)
c)
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of tug
mission.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause tanks to
collapse during reentry.
A & B) No effect.
Not applicable.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
causes inability to make
vehicle safe for reentry.
A & B) No effect
Not applicable.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause inability to
make vehicle safe for
reentry.
Componcnt Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 318
Solenoid Valve, N. C. (Contd)
FAILURE _kODE EFFECTS /dqALYSIS
ON s_Ac_ rUG Mrss_oN
HELIUM sYs'rE,_
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
closed and
internal
leakage
External
leakage
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause premature
pressurization.
c)
Possible Loss.
Failure to contain helium
supply would cause loss of
helium purge system.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause inability to
use helium system.
A & B) Possible Loss.
Excessive leakage could
cause loss of helium supply
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of helium
pressurization.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
>_I_fon L Cr.,=
A) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause loss of tug
mission due to premature
pressurization.
B) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium supply
would cause inability to
make vehicle safe for
reentry.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause inability to
make vehicle safe for
reentry.
A & B) Possible Loss.
Loss of helium supply
would cause inability to
make vehicle safe for
reentry.
c) No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could cause tanks to
collapse during reentry.
O
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FAILURE ,_kODE EFFECTS ,%NALYSIS
ON SPACE I_JG MISSION
HELIUM S_'STE._
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 319
Pressure Regulator
2 required
These regulators are provided so
that the pressure from the helium
supply spheres can be reduced for
purging and pressurization prior
to reentry. They are redundant
for regulates high or low.
COMPONENT CODE: 320
Spheres
2 required
These spheres provide storage for
the reentry purge helium supply.
COMPONENT CODE: 321
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
1 required
This valve provides on-off
capability between the helium
sphere fill line and ground
equipment. It is opened during
ground operations only.
Failure Y_de
Regulates high
or low
Burst
Fails to open
and remain open
Failure Effect on System
A & B) No effect.
Regulators do not affect
purge and pressurization
system during this time.
c) No effect.
Redundant regulator is
provided.
A, B, & C) Actual Loss.
Loss of helium system
results.
A, B, & C) No effect.
Valve is not required to
open during this time.
Failure E_fcct e_ Vehicle,
A & B) No effect.
Not applicable.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A, B, & C) Actual Loss.
Loss of helium system
causes loss of tug
mission. Burst of helium
sphere could create a
hazard to shuttle crew.
A, B, & C) No effect.
Not applicable.
FAILURE_X)DEEFFECTS_LNALYSISONSPACETUGMISSION
HELIUM SYSTEM
ComponentIdentification
COMPONENTCODE: 321
Solenoid Valve, N. C. (Contd)
Failure,Mode
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
leakage
FailureEffecton System
A, B, & C) No effect.
Valve is closed during this
time.
A, B, & C) Possible Loss.
Excessive loss of helium
causes loss of purge
System.
Failure Effect on Vehicle°
A, B, & C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A, B, & C) Possible Loss.
Loss of purge system
causes inability to make
vehidle safe for reentry.
OXYGENFEED,FILL, DRAIN,VENTANDREENTRY
PURGESYSTEMFAILUREMODE,EFFECTSANDCRITICALITYANALYSIS
This section presents a preliminary failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis of the Space Tug OxygenFeed, Fill, Drain, Vent and Reentry
Purge System. This system performs the following functions:
(a) The feed system is comprised of the ducting and associated valving
which is required to route the propellants from the tank to the
engine system.
(b) The fill and drain lines are provided to allow the LO 2 tank to
be filled on the ground. Ground draining of propellants may be
accomplished through the fill line.
(c) The vent and relief system is provided to insure that tank pressures
are maintained within structural design limits during ground and
inflight operation.
(d) The reentry purge system provides conditioning of the main and APS
LO 2 tank for reentry by the use of a helium purge and pressurization
of the tanks.
The system schematic and the system block diagram are presented in
Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
ASSUMPTIONS AND GROUND RULES
I. The quick disconnects were analyzed as if they were independent components,
although they are part of an umbilical plate.
2. Failure of the idle mode operation results in loss of ability to start
the main engines.
3. There are valves within the main engine which provide redundancy for
the isolation valve.
4. The following time phases were used for this analysis:
Phase A Boost and separation of 2.85 hours
Tug and Shuttle
Phase B Tug orbital operations and 136 hours
redocking with Shuttle
Phase C Tug repressurization and 16.7 hours
return to Earth
104
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The predicted probability of this system performing for the duration of
a Tug mission is 0.998777.
A check valve could be provided downstream of valves 211 to prevent flow
of LO 2 into the LH 2 system. If one of the redundant valves were to fail
open or leak then a hazardous situation exists.
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COMPONENT
CODE
201
202
204
205
206
207
OXYGEN FEED, FILL, DRAIN, VENT AND REENTRY PURGE SYSTEM
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
ITEM FAILURE MODE CRITICALITY
Quick Disconnect
Quick Disconnect
Pneumatic Valve
2 required
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid Valve
2 required
Fails to disconnect
Leakage
Fails to connect
Leakage
Fails to close
Interiw_l'leakage and fails to
remain closed
External leakage
Internal Leakage
Fails to open and remain open
Fails to close and remain closed
External leakage
Internal leakage and fails
to remain closed
External leakage
Internal leakage and fails to
remain closed
Fails to close
163.07
8.15
163.07
8.15
4.28
42.89
.78
55.89
125.12
6.88
.78
17.3
i .59
3.4
1.3
O
--4
COMPONENT
CODE
208
209
210
211
212
OXYGEN FEED, FILL, DRAIN, VENT AND REENTRY PURGE SYSTEM
CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
(Continued)
ITEM FAILURE MODE CRITICALITY
Solenoid Valve
2 required
Pneumatic Valve
2 required
Solenoid Valve
Solenoid Valve
2 required
Pneumatic Valve
External leakage
Internal leakage and fails to
remain closed
Fails to close
External leakage
Internal leakage and fails to
remain closed
Fails to close
External leakage
Internal leakage and fails to
remain closed
Fails to open
Fails to remain open
External leakage
Internal leakage and fails to
remain closed
Fails to close
External leakage
Fails to open
Fails to remain open
i .59
159.51
12.49
1.59
159.51
12.49
.78
62.56
i .07
i .07
i .59
138.
2.15
.78
62.56
6.256
IN3A ?09
3_.oN
'_o_
L
S]ATVA ZO1
NOII='L_ ]1_0 --
O0
0
,--4
FIGIrRE 9. OXYGEN FEED, FILL, DRAIN AND VENT SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
OXYGEN FEED, FILL
DRAIN AND VENT
SYSTEM
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OComponent Identification
COMPONENT CODE : 201
Quick Disconnect
1 required
This quick disconnect connects
the LO 2 fill and drain line of
tug to payload bay. It has an
internal check valve which
prevents LO 2 backflow.
FAILURE HODE EFFECTS BNAITSTS
ON SPACE TdG MISSION
OXYGEN S_STEM
Failure Mode
Fails to connect
Fails to
disconnect
A)
B)
C)
A)
_,C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect°
Not required to connect
during this phase.
No effect.
Oxygen is vented through
the GO 2 vent line.
No effect.
System is connected
prior to this phase.
Actual loss.
Loss of ability to
separate the system
from the payload bay.
No effect.
Failure does not apply
during these phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mtssion_ Crew
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B)
c)
No effect°
Oxygen is vented through
the GO 2 vent line.
No effect.
Not applicable.
A) Actual loss.
Loss of ability to
separate the space tug
from the shuttle.
_,c) No effect.
Failure does not
apply during these
phases.
F-J
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identif[cation
COMPONENT CODE : 201
Quick Disconnect
COMPONENT CODE : 202
(Cont.)
Quick Disconnect
1 required
This quick disconnect connects
the GO 2 vent line of the tug to
the payload bay. It has an
internal check valve.
Failure Mode
Leakage
Fails to connect
A)
Failure Effect on System
B)
Possible loss.
Oxygen would leak into
the payload bay creating
a fire hazard.
c)
A)
No effect.
Even if the upstream
valve opens, the amount
of leakage into space is
not critical.
No effect.
The oxygen is dumped
prior to docking.
No effect.
Not required to connect
during this phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A)
B)
Possible loss.
Oxygen would leak into
the payload creating
a fire hazard and
danger to crew.
No effect.
No critical effect.
c) No effect.
The oxygen is dumped
prior to docking.
A) No effect.
This failure does not
apply.
_o
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE: 202 (Cont.)
Quick Disconnect
FAILURE _DDE EFFECTS ANALYSTS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
f)Xyf_i____ SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to
disconnect
Failure Effect on System
B) Possible loss.
Loss of ability to
perform GO 2 vent.
c) No effect.
The disconnect has
already been connected
prior to this phase.
A) Actual loss.
Loss of ability to
separate the system from
the payload bay.
B,C) No effect.
This failure does not
apply during these
phases°
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
B)
C)
Possible loss.
Loss of capability to
safe the tug. Residual
oxygen could make the
tug a safety hazard.
No effect.
Th_s failure does not
apply.
A) Actual loss.
Loss of ability to
separate the space tug
from the shuttle.
B,C) No effect.
This failure does not
apply during these
phases.
O0
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Component Identlflcatlon Fa£1ure Mode Failure Effect on System Misslon_ Crew
COMPONENT CODE:
Quick Disconnect
202 (Cont.)
Leakage
COMPONENT CODE: 203
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 required
These pneumatic valves provide
on-off capability to vent
through the non-propulsive
nozzles. These valves remain
in the last commanded position.
They are redundant for fails
to open.
Fails to open°
A)
B)
C)
A)
Possible loss.
Oxygen could leak into the
payload by creating a fire
hazard.
No effect.
Even if the upstream valve
opens, the amount of
leakage into space is not
critical.
No effect.
Oxygen is dumped prior to •
docking.
No effect.
Not required to open
during this phase.
A) Possible loss.
Oxygen could leak into
the payload by creating
a fire hazard.
B) No effect.
No critical effect.
c)
A)
No effect.
Oxygen is dumped prior
to docking.
No effect.
Not applicable.
FAILUREMODEEFFECTSANALYSIS
ONSPACETUGMISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
COMPPONENT CODE: 203 (Cont.)
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 requfred
Failure Mode
Fails to close •
B)
C)
A)
B)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure.
Failure of both valves
results in loss of
capability to vent space
tug during orbital •
operations°
No effect.
Not required to operate
during this phase.
No effect.
Valve is already in closed
position during this phase.
No effect for single
failure.
Failure of upstream valve
would result in loss of
8)
C)
A)
B)
ability to stop orbital
venting.
FaLlure Effect on Vehicle,
Hies[on i Crew
No effect for single
failure.
Failure of both valves
results in loss of
ability to maintain
proper NPSH.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect.
Not applicable.
No effect for single
failure.
A double failure results
in loss of tug mission du_
to loss of ability to •
control tug venting.
L_
FAILURE MODE EI:FECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Component IdentLflcatLon Failure Mode Failure Effect on System _i_:stonL Crew
i
Fails to remain
COMPONENT CODE: 203 (Cont.)
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 required
c)
open
A)
B)
C)
No effect.
Valve already in closed
position.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this phase.
No effect for single
failure.
Failure of both valves
results in loss of
capability to vent space
tug during orbital
operations.
No effect.
Valve is closed during
this phase.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
A) No effect.
Not applicable.
B) No effect for single
failure.
Failure of both valves
results in loss of
ability to maintain
proper NPSH.
C) No effect.
Not applicable.
O_
Component Identification
COMPONENT CODE 203 (Cont.)
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 required
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS _NALYS[S
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
___QEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
closed and
leakage
A)
B)
C)
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure.
If upstream vent valve
also fails, then oxygen
will leak into the payload
bay creating a safety
hazard.
No effect.
These valves are normally
open in this phase.
No effect for single
failure.
If one of the upstream
vent valves also fails,
then the ability to
maintain tug pressure
requirements will be lost.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mi_:_[on_ Crew
A)
B)
C)
No effect for single
failure.
If upstream vent valve
also fails, then oxygen
will leak into the
payload bay creating
a fire hazard.
No effect.
These valves are normally
open in this phase.
No effect for single
failure.
If one of the upstream
vent valves also fails,
then the loss of ability
to maintain pressure
would result in loss
of structural integrity
of space tug for reentry.
i
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FAILURE _K)DE EFFECTS ?_NALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 204
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 Required
These normally closed orientation
dependent LO 2 valves provide on-off
capability to the G02 vent line.
These valves allow the LO 2 tank to be
vented prior to orbital operations.
After redocking one of these valves
must open to allow the tank and
system to be purged.
Failure Mode
Fails to open
Fails to close
A .
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, the ability to vent
through the GO 2 vent line
will be lost.
B. No effect. Valves are not
required to open during
this phase.
C. No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, the ability to purge
the LO 2 tank will be lost.
A.
B.
C.
Actual Loss
Loss of ability to control
GO 2 vent. Venting of LO 2
tank cannot be stopped.
No effect. Valve is
already closed prior to
this phase.
Actual Loss
Loss of ability to
pressurize space tug.
t
Failure Effec= en Vehicle,
v
A .
B.
No effect for single
failure. Failure of both
valves results in loss of
ability to maintain tank
pressure within structural
limits.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Co
A.
B°
No effect for single
failure. Failure of both
valves results in loss of
ability to purge LO 2 and
residual oxygen would
remain in the tug.
Possible Loss
Depletion of oxygen supply
could result in early
mission termination of
space tug.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
C ° Possible Loss
Inability to pressurize
the tuE would result in
loss of structural integrit
Component Identification
Component Code: 204
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Continued)
>.a
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS /_N..tLYSiS
ON SeACE TJO MISSXOX
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to remain
open
Fails to remain
closed and
internal leakage
A6
B O
C.
A ,
B"
Failure Effect on Systetn
No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, the ability to vent
LO 2 tank would be lost.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, the ability to
complete LO 2 purge would
be lost.
Actual Loss
Loss of ability to control
GO 2 venting. Venting of
LO 2 tank cannot be stopped.
No effect for single
failure. Redundancy is
provided by the check valve
in the disconnect. Double
failure would result in
loss of oxygen overboard.
A .
B,
C .
A .
B.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
results in loss of ability
to maintain pressure
requirements in LO 2 tank.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
results in incomplete
purge. The tug could not
be made completely safe
for reentry.
Possible Loss
Depletion of oxygen supply
could result in early
mission termination of
space tug.
No effect for single
failure. Double failure
could result in early
mission termination due to
depletion of oxygen supply
Component Identlficat[on
Component Code: 204
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Continued)
Component Code: 205
Solenoid Valve
i required
This normally closed idle mode
valve provides on-off capability
from the APS tank to the engine. It
is opened during idle mode operation
to cool the main engine turbopump.
FAILURE }_DE EFFECTS ;_NALYSIS
oN SPAC_ TUC M_SS_ON
OXYGEN sYsrE_
Failure Mode
External leakage
Internal leakage
C .
A.
B.
Failure Effect on Sys=e_a
Actual Loss
Loss of ability to
pressurize space tug.
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into payload
bay which could resul_ in
loss of APS.
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 overboard
resulting in depletion of
APS supply.
C. Possible Loss
A.
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
No effect. Engine valves
downstream provide multiple
redundancy.
Failure Effect ca VehLcle,
C. Possible Loss
Inability to pressurize
the tug would result in
loss of structural
integrity during reentry.
A.
B .
C.
A .
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into
payload bay rgsulting in
a safety hazard and loss
of the APS.
Possible Loss
Depletion of APS supply
could lead to early
mission termination.
Possible Loss
Loss of APS pressure
results in loss of
structural integrity of
the tug APS tank during
reentry.
No effect. Engine valves
downstream provide multipl
redundancy.
_O
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FAILURE _X_DE EFFECTS ]_NALY$1S
ON SPACE TJG MISSION
OXYGEN S_S'_E_
Component Identification
Component Code: 205
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Failure Mode
Fails to open
and remain open
Fails to Close
and remain closed
B.
C .
A+
Bo
C .
A .
B.
Failure Effect on System
Possible Loss
This valve closes after
idle mode operation.
Leakage could result in
depletion of APS supply.
No effect. Engine valves
downstream provide multiple
redundancy.
No effect. Failure dges
not apply.
Actual Loss
Loss of ability to provide
idle mode operation.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Actual Loss
Premature depletion of
APS supply.
Failure Effect c_ Vehicle,
B . Possible Loss
Depletion of APS supply
could result in early
mission termination.
C o No effect. Engine valves
downstream provide multipl
redundancy.
A. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of capability to
start the main engines due
to loss of idle mode
operation.
C. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
A. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
B. Possible Loss
Depletion of APS supply
could lead to early
mission termination.
_O
FAILURE F_DE EFFECTS tJ_:tLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG M_SS_O_
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 205
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 206
Solenoid Valve
i required
This normally closed solenoid valve
is opened to allow the APS tank to
be filled prior to launch. Inflight
it can be opened to allow the APS
tank to be vented through the
non-propulsive nozzles.
Failure Mode
External leakage
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
C .
Ao
B .
Failure Effect on System
No effect. Engine valves
downstream provide
multiple redundancy.
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO_ into the
payload bay A_S supply
could be depleted.
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 overboard
resulting in depletion of
APS supply.
C. Possible Loss
A .
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
Possible Loss
Leakage of oxygen overboard
resulting in depletion of
APS tank supply.
Failure Effect cn Vehicle,
C . No effect. Engine valves
downstream provide
multiple redundancy.
A °
B.
C.
A.
Possible Loss
LO 2 in payload bay could
create a safety hazard.
Depletion of APS supply
could lead to early
mission terminat ion.
Possible Loss
Depletion of APS supply
could lead to early
mission termination.
Possible Loss
Loss of APS pressure
results in loss of
structural integrity of
the tug APS tank during
reentry.
Possible Loss
Depletion of APS tank
supply could lead to
early mission termination.
Do
FAILUItE I,XDDE EFFKCTS P_N..\LYSIS
o_ se:cE T:J¢M:SS:OX
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Componcn$ Identification
Component Code: 206
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 207
Failure Modc
Solenoid Valve
2 required
Fails to close,
fails to open
and fails to
remain open
External leakage
These normally closed orientation
dependent LO 2 valves provide on-off
capability to the GO 2 vent line for
the APS tank. These valves are
opened to vent the APS tank to
required pressure limits.
l
B.
Failure Effect on Systc_a
No effect for single
failure. A check valve is
provided downstream, a
double failure results in
premature depletion of APS
tank supply.
C. Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
A, B, C. No effect.
Failure does not apply.
A. Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay. APS tank
supply could be depleted.
B.
Failure Effect ca Vehicle,
No effect for single
failure. A double failure
results in depletion of
APS tank supply which
could lead to early
mission termination.
Co Possible Loss
Loss of APS pressure
results in loss of
structural integrity of
the tug APS tank during
reentry.
A, B, C. No effect.
Failure does not apply.
A. Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay could create
a safety hazard. Excess
depletion of APS tank
could lead to early
mission termination.
Component IdencifLcacion
Component Code: 207
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
FAILURE _DE EFFECTS _kLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN _ SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
B ,
Failure Effect on Systeta
Possible Loss
Premature depletion of APS
tank supply.
C. Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
Ao
Bo
Possible Loss
Leakage of oxygen overboard
resulting in depletion of
APS tank supply.
No effect for single
failure. A check valve is
provided downstream, a
double failure results in
premature depletion of APS
tank supply.
C. Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
Failure Effcc= o_ Vehicle,
Bo
C ,
A ,
B,
Possible Loss
Depletion of.APS tank
supply could lead to
early mission termination.
Possible Loss
Loss of APS pressure
results in loss of
structural integrity of
the tug APS tank during
reentry.
Possible Loss
Depletion of APS tank
supply could lead to earl _
mission termination.
No effect for single
failure. A double failure
results in depletion of
APS tank supply which
could lead to early
mission termination.
C • Possible Loss
Loss of APS pressure
results in loss of
structural integrity of
the tug APS tank during
reentry.
_O
FAILURE _X)DE EFFECTS Y_N:LLYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYS'rE._
Component Identification
Component Code: 207
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Component Code:
Solenoid Valve
2 required
208
These normally closed vent and
relief valves provide on-off
capability to the tug vent line.
These valves are used during tug
orbital operations to maintain APS
tank pressure requirements and to
dump the residual LO 2 prior to
redocking.
Failure Mode
Fails to close
Fails to open
and remain open
External leakage
Failure Effect on Syste_n
A . Actual Loss
Loss of ability to shut
off venting of the APS tank
B & C. No effect.
Failure does not apply.
A . No effect for single
failure. Failure of both
valves would result in loss
of ability to vent the APS
tank.
B & Co No effect.
Failure does not apply.
A . Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay.
B. Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 overboard.
A °
Failure Effcc_ c:_ Vehicle,
Possible Loss
Premature depletion of the
APS tank leading to early
mission termination.
B & C. No effect.
Failure does not apply.
A. No effect for single
failure. Failure of both
valves results in loss of
ability to maintain
pressure requirements in
the APS tank due to loss
of vent capability.
B & C. No effect.
Failure does not apply.
A o
B .¸
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay creating a
safety hazard and
premature depletion of the
APS tank.
Possible Loss
Loss of LO 2 overboard could
result in premature depleti
of LO 2 in APS tank.
tO
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Component Identiflcat£on
Component Code: 208
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
FAILURE MODE EFFI_CTS ?_XALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN sYsr_M
Failure ,Mode
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
Failure Effec= on System
C. Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
Possible Loss
Leakage of oxygen overboard
through the fill and drain
line.
Ao
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to shut
off venting of the APS tank
B °
C. Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
Co
A °
Be
C .
A oFails to close A. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Failure Effc¢= oa Veh/¢Ic,
Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank pressure
could result in loss of
structural integrity of
APS tank during reentry.
Possible Loss
Leakage of oxygen over-
board could result in
premature depletion of
LOo in the APS tank
whlch+ could lead to early
mission termination.
PossibleILoss
Continuous venting of the
APS tank could result in
depletion of LO 2 and early
mission termination.
Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank pressure
results in loss of
structural integrity durinl
reentry.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
_O
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FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ;_N;LLYSIS
ON SPACE rue _SS_O_
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identlficstion
Component Code: 208
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 209
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
2 Required
These normally closed vent and
relief valves provide on-off
capability to LO 2 tank vent line.
These valves are used during tug
orbital operations to maintain prope_
pressure in the main LO 2 tank.
Failure Mode
Fails to open
and fails to
remain open
External leakage
B.
C.
A.
B •
C .
A o
Failure Effect on Syste_a
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to shut
off venting of the APS tank
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, then the ability to
maintain pressure require-
ments in the APS tank will
be lost.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay.
Failure Effect cn Vehicle,
B.
C .
A .
B.
C.
Possible Loss
Continuous venting of the
APS tank could result in
depletion of LO 2 and
mission termination.
No effect. Failure does
Not apply.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect for single
failure. Failure of both
valves results in loss of
ability to maintain
pressure requirements of
APS tank.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
A. Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay creating a
safety hazard and
premature depletion of
the APS tank.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
_omponent Code: 209
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Continued)
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
B.
Failure Effect on System
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 overboard.
C. Possible Loss
A,
Be
C.
Loss of APS tank
pressurization.
Possible Loss
Leakage of oxygen overboard
through the fill and drain
line.
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to shut
off venting of the main
LO 2 tank.
Possible Loss
Loss of main LO 2 tank
pre ssur izat ion.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B.
C,
No
B°
C°
Possible Loss
Loss of LO_ overboard
could result in premature
depletion of LO 2 in APS
tank.
Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank pressure
could result in loss of
structural integrity of
APS tank during reentry.
Possible Loss
Leakage of oxygen over-
board could result in
premature depletion of
LO 2 in the main LO 2 tank
which could lead to early
mission termination°
Possible Loss
Continuous venting of the
main LO o tank could
result In depletion of
LO 2 and early mission
termination.
Possible Loss
Loss of L0 o tank pressure
results in_loss of stru-
ctural integrity of main
tank during reentry.
bo
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FAILURE MODEEFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACETUG_:-flSSION
OX-fGEN SYSTE>_
Component Identification Failure Mode Failure Effect on System Failure Effect on Vehicle,Mission. Crew
3omponent Code : 209
7alve, Pneumatically Operated
(Continued)
Fails to close
Fails to open
and fails to
remain open
A.
Bo
C °
A .
B.
C .
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to shut
off venting of the main
LO 2 tank.
No effect. Failure @oes
not apply.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, then the ability to
maintain pressure require-
ments in the main LO 2 tank
will be lost.
No effect° Failure does
not apply.
A ,
B.
C °
A.
B.
C o
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Possible Loss
Continuous venting of the
main LO 2 tank could
result in depletion of
LO_ and early mission
2
termination.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect for single
failure. If both valves
fail, then the ability to
maintain pressure require.
ments in the main LO 2 tanl
will be lost.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
%O
FAILURE _DE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
Component Code : 210
Solenoid Valve
i required
This normally closed solenoid
valve is opened after redocking
to allow the APS tank to be
pressurized before reentry.
External leakage
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
A .
B.
C.
A .
B,
C,
Failure Effect on System
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO^ tank into
z
the payload bay.
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 overboard.
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to
maintain pressure in the
APS tank.
No effect. Multiple
redundancy is provided.
Possible Loss
Premature depletion of
the LO 2 in the APS tank.
No effect° Multiple
redundancy.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
Ao
B°
C.
A.
B.
Co
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay creating a
safety hazard and
premature depletion of
APS tank.
Loss of LO 2 overboard
could result in
premature depletion of
LO 2 in APS tank.
Possible Loss
Loss of pressure in the
APS tank results in loss
of structural integrity
of the tank during reentr _
No effect. Multiple
redundancy is_provided.
Possible Loss
Premature depletion of
LO 2 in APS tank could
lead to early mission
termination.
No effect. Multiple
redundancy.
O_
O
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN _ SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 210
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Failure Mode
Faiis to close
Fails to open
Fails to remain
open
Failure Effect on System
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. No effect° Multiple
redundancy provided.
A & B. • No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. Actual Loss
Loss of ability to
pressurize APS tank.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to
adequately pressurize APS
tank.
Co
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C ° Possible Loss
Loss of APS tank
pressurization results
in loss of structural
integrity of APS tank
during reentry.
A & B No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. Possible Loss
Loss of ability to
adequately pressurize APS
tank could result in loss
of structural integrity
of APS tank during reentr"
L_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 211
Solenoid Valve
2 required
These normally closed LO^ purge
Z
valves provide on-off capability
between the LO 2 tank and the
helium purge system. They are
opened after redocking to
pressurize the LO 2 tank.
Failure Mode
A.
Failure Effect on System
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 could result
in premature depletion of
LO 2 supply.
B. Possible Loss
L0 supply could be ,2
prematurely depleted.
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to maintain
proper pressure in the LO 2
tank.
A .
B.
Co
External leakage
Co
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into
payload bay r_sulting
in a safety hazard.
Premature depletion of
LO 2 could lead to early
termination of tug
mission.
Possible Loss
Depletion of LO_ supply
Z
could lead to early
termination of tug
mission.
Possible Loss
Loss of pressurization
would result in loss of
structural integrity of
the LO 2 tank during
reentry.
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
A & B. Possible Loss
LO would leak into the
hydrogen side of the tug
purge system.
A & B. Possible Loss
LO 2 leakage to the
hydrogen side of the tug
purge system could result
in loss of the shuttle
and tug as well as shuttl,
crew. If the LO 2 would
come in contact with the
L_, then _ catastrophic
ezrecu woulm resu1_.
_o
_o
Component Identification
Component Code: 211
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fails to close
Fails to open
Fails to remain
open
Failure Effect on System
C. No effect° Multiple
redundancy provided.
C,
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C, Possible Loss
Loss of ability to
maintain pressure in LO 2
tank.
A & Bo No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C 0 No effect for single
failure. Loss of ability
to pressurize the LO 2
tanks if double failure
Occurs.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. Possible Loss
Loss of ability to
maintain pressure in LO 2
tanks would result in
loss of structural
integrity of the tanks
during reentry.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
Co No effect for single
failure. Inability to
pressurize LO 2 tanks
results in loss of
structural integrity of
the tanks during reentry
if double failure occurs.
A & B. No effect, Failure
does not apply.
_O
_O
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OAqfGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 211
Solenoid Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 212
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
i Required
This normally closed feedline
isolation valve provides on-off
capability between the engine and
LO 2 tanks. It is opened during
the idle mode phase and remains
open during tug orbital
operations.
Failure Mode
External leakage
Internal leakage
and fails to
remain closed
C.
Failure Effect on System
No effect for single
failure. Loss of ability
to pressurize LO 2 tanks to
required pressure if
double failure occurs.
A. Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload and depletion of
LO 2 in the main tank.
B. Possible Loss
Excessive leakage could
result in premature
depletion of LO 2 in the
main tank.
C.
A .
Possible Loss
Loss of ability to
maintain pressure in main
LO 2 tank.
No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
C. No effect for single+
failure. Improper
pressure in LO^ tanks
. g
could result in loss of
structural integrity of
LO 2 tanks during
reentry if double
failure occurs.
A.
B.
C.
Ao
Possible Loss
Leakage of LO 2 into the
payload bay creates a
safety hazard.
Possible Loss
Premature depletion of
LO 2 supply could result
in early mission
termination.
Possible Loss
Loss of LO 2 tank
pressure could result in
loss of tank structural
integrity during reentry.
No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided.
Lo
Component Identification
Component Code: 212
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Continued)
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS #_NALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYS'_EM
Failure Mode
Fails to close
Fails to open
Fails to remain
open
Failure Effect on System
B. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
C. No effect. Multiple
redu _y provided.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided..
A. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
B. Actu i Loss
Loss of ability to supply
LO 2 to the main engine.
C. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
A. No effect. Failure does
not pply.
B.
Co
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided.
A & B. No effect. Failure
does not apply.
C. No effect. Multiple
redundancy provided.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
B. Actual Loss
Inability to provide LO 2
to main engine results
in loss of tug mission.
C. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
A. No effect. Failure does
not apply.
A.
L_
L_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
OXYGEN SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 212
Valve, Pneumatically Operated
(Continued)
Component Code: 213
Nozzle
2 Required
These nozzles provide the capability
for a non-propulsive vent during
tug orbital operations.
Failure Mode
No Applicable
Failure Modes
B+
C.
Failure Effect on System
Actual Loss
Loss of ability to provide
flow of LO 2 to the main
engines.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B°
C®
Possible Loss
The flow of LO 2 to the
main engines is cut off.
This could result in
turbopump cavitation
and loss of mission and
vehicle due to fire and
explosion.
No effect. Failure does
not apply.
AUXILIARYPROPULSIONSYSTEMFAILUREMODE,
EFFECTSANDCRITICALITYANALYSIS
This section presents a preliminary failure mode, effects and criticality
analysis of the Space Tug Auxiliary Propulsion System. This system
provides the necessary thrust to perform the following functions:
(a) Maintain Tug Vehicle attitude control throughout the coast phases
of the mission.
(b) Perform stage _V maneuvers for mid-course corrections.
(c) Perform transverse and lateral translation maneuversduring
rendezvous and docking.
(d) Perform vehicle and sensor pointing and alignment as required.
The APS system schematic and the APS system block diagram are presented in
Figures i0 and ii, respectively. Figures 12, 13 and 14 present block
diagrams for the APS and Main Tank Pressurization Subsystem, the APSLH2
Conditioning and Feed Subsystemand the APSLO2 Conditioning and Feed
Subsystem, respectively.
ASSUMPTIONS AND GROUND RULES
io The APS has "thruster out" capability and can perform its mission with
one thruster pod disabled.
2. The system has adequate sensing devices to monitor critical functions
and to detect malfunctions.
3. All valves are "fail safe" in their normal position.
4. The APS system analyzed by this FEA does not have the capability to
re-pressurize the main engine propellant tanks from the main engines.
5. The following time phases were used for this analysis:
Phase A Boost and separation of 2.85 hours
Tug and Shuttle
Phase B Tug orbital operations and 136 hours
redocking with Shuttle
Phase C Tug repressurization and 16.7 hours
return to Earth
136
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The predicted probability of the APS system performing for the duration
of a Tug mission is 0.983002.
Approximately 36 percent of the criticality associated with the Tug APS
System is caused by the gas generator bi-propellant valves, items 45 and 46.
This criticality results from the possibility of a failure to close,
failure to remain closed and leakage of these valves. The inclusion of
shutoff valves in the portion of the propellant feed lines which serves
only the bi-propellant valves would eliminate this criticality and increase
the mission success probability from 0.983002 to 0.989288.
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AUXILIARYPROPULSIONSYSTEM
CRITICALITEMSLIST
Lo
OO
COMPONENT
CODE
01
06
08
39
4O
44
45
46
47
ITEM
Quick Disconnect
Solenoid Valve, N. Co
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
Quick Disconnect
Quick Disconnect
Thruster
Bi-Propellant Valve
Bi-Propellant Valve
Filter
FAILURE TYPE
Fail to disengage
Fail to close, fail to
remain closed and major
leakage
Minor leakage
Fail to close, fail to
remain closed and major
leakage
Minor leakage
Fail to disengage
Fail to disengage
Burn-Thru
Fail to close, fail to
remain closed and major.
leakage
Minor leakage
Fail to close, fail to
remain closed and major
leakage
Minor leakage
Clogs
CRITICALITY
1556
1289
102
1289
102
1556
1556
2372
2855
228
2855
228
408
AUXILIARYPROPULSIONSYSTEM
CRITICALITEMSLIST
_O
kO
COMPONENT
CODE
48
49
50
ITEM
Filter
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
FAILURE TYPE
Clogs
Fail to open
Fail to close, fail to
remain closed and major
leakage
Fail to open
Fail to close, fail to
remain closed and major
leakage
CRITICALITY
4O8
63
34
63
34
TOTAL 16,998
.6..
0
51
E
q7
FIGURE 10, SPACE TUG AUXILIARY PROPULSION
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Component Identification
Component Code: 01
Quick Disconnect
i Required
Provides a connection at the tug/
payload bay interface for the
helium fill operation.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fail to engage
Fail to
disengage
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect o
Be
Disconnect
is already engaged during
these phases.
No effect. After the tug
completes its mission and
returns to the orbiter,
all propellants and
pressurants are dumped
overboard prior to docking.
In addition, the sol_noid
shut-off valves at the fill
lines will be closed prior
to storing the _ug in the
orbiter for return to
earth.
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode not applicable during
these phases.
B. Actual Loss
The failure of the tug
disconnects to disengage at
the tug/payload bay inter-
face will cause the tug to
remain docked to the
orbiter and unable to
perform its mission.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
_lission_ Crew
A & C. No effect. Disconnect
is already engaged during
these phases.
B. No effect. L
A&C. No effect. Not
applicable during these
phases.
Bo Actual Loss
FaILUrE MODE EFTECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISStO_
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
Component Code: 01
Quick Disconnect (Continued)
Component Code:
Filter
i Required
Leakage
02
Clogs
Removes contaminants from the
helium supply during ground fill
operation.
Component Code: 03
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
i Required
Controls the flow of helium to
the helium storage tank during
ground filling operation.
Fail to open
Fails to close
Fails to remain
closed and
leakage
Failure Effect on System
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
solenoid shutoff valves.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Filter is not used during
these phases. Any problem
encountered during the fill
operation would be corrected
prior to lift off.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these
phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these
phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided by
disconnect, component code
01.
Failure Effec_ on Vehicle,
Mis_ion_ Crew
A, B, & C. No effect.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
A, B, & Co No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these
phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these
phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy is provided by
disconnect, component code
01.
"4
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 04
Relief Valve
I Required
Protects the helium storage tank
against over-pressurization during
filling.
Component Code: 05
Helium Storage Tank
I Required
Stores the helium used to
pressurize the APS propellant
tanks.
Component:Code: 06
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 Required
Controls the flow of helium to
the APS LH 2 tank for pressurization.
Failure Mode
Fail to open
Fail to remain
closed and
leakage
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not required to operate
during these phases.
!A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve is burst disc/relief
type and therefore provides
redundancy for this failure
mode.
N/A
!A & B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
C. No effect. Valve is not
required to operate during
this phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not required to operate
during these phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve is burst disc/relief
type and therefore provides
redundancy for this failure
type.
N/A
A & B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
C. No effect.
Oo
Component Identification
Component Code: 06
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
(Continued)
Component Code: 07
Orifice
i Required
Provides damping for the initial
helium surge and provides flow
control of the helium used to
pressurize the APS LH 2 tank.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fail to close,
Ifail to remain
closed and
leakage
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Failure Effect on System
& C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. Probable Loss
The continuous flow of
helium to the APS tank will
cause the tank to be over-
pressurized and the helium
will be vented overboard.
Unscheduled venting will
cause premature depletion
of the helium supply.
N/A
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Cre_
A & C. No effect.
B.
N/A
Probable Loss
Premature depletion of
helium supply will cause
loss of mission.
$-
_D
Component Identification
Component Code: 08
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
2 Required
Controls the flow of helium to the
APS LO 2 tank for pressurization.
Component Code:
Orifice
I Required
Failure Mode
Fail to open A&B.
Failure Effect on System
No effect.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
.... Misslon,. Cre_¢
A & B. No effect.
09
C .
Redundancy provided.
No effect. Valve is not
require d to operate during
this phase.
Redundancy provided.
C. No effect. Not
applicable during this
phase.
Provides damping for the initial
helium surge and provides flow
control of the helium used to
'pressurize the APS LO 2 tank.
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
No Applicable
Failure Modes
A & C. No effect. Failure
mode is not applicable
during phases.
B. Probable Loss
The continuous flow of
helium to the APS LO 2 tank
will cause the tank to be
overpressurized and the
helium will be vented
overboard° Unscheduled
venting will cause
premature depletion of the
helium supply.
N/A
A & C. No effect.
B°
N/A
Probable _oss
Premature depletion of
helium supply will cause
loss of mission.
L_
O
Component Identification
Component Code : i0
Heat Exchanger
i Required
Provides a means of equalizing the
temperature of the helium and the
LO 2 prior to pressurizing the APS
LO 2 tank.
Component Code: ii
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
1 Required
Controls the flow of LH 2 to Heat
Exchanger, Component Code 16, for
conditioning the LO 2 feed line.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ,tNALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY _P_ SYSTEM
Failure Mode
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Fail to open
Fail to close
Fails to remain
closed and
leakage
Failure Effect on System
N/A
A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve remains open during
these phases unless venting
is required.
A & C. No effect.
Valve is open during
these phases.
B. No effect. If venting
occurs while this valve is
open, some propellant will
be lost. Because scheduled
venting occurs at the end
of this phase, loss of
some propellant will not
cause any problems.
A & C. No effect.
Valve is open during
these phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Cre_
N/A
A, B, & C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
B. No effect. Loss of
propellant at the end
of this phase will not
affect the mission.
A & C. No effect.
Ln
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: ii
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
(Continued)
Component Code: 12
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
Failure Mode
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
B. No effect. Because the
valve is open except during
venting, failure to remain
closed or leakage may cause
loss of some ofpropellant
at the end of this phase.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Valve remains open du_ingi Required
Controls the flow of LH 2 to Heat
Exchanger; Component Code 15, for
conditioning the LH 2 feed line.
Fail to close
Fail to remain
closed and
leakage
these phases unless venting
is required.
A & C. No effect.
Valve is open during these
phases.
B. No effect. If venting
occurs while this valve is
open, some propellant will
be lost. Because scheduled
venting occurs at the end
of this phase, loss of some
propellant will not cause
any problems.
A & C. No effect.
Valve is open during these
phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Crew
B, No effect. Loss of
propellant at the end of
this phase will not
affect the mission.
A, B, & C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
B. No effect. Loss of
propellant at the end of
this phase will not
affect the mission.
A & C. No effect.
k_
FAILUP_ MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 12
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
(Continued)
Component Code: 13
Orifice
i Required
Provides flow control of the LH 2
used to condition the LO 2 line.
Component Code: 14
Orifice
i Required
Provides flow control of the LH 2
used to condition the LH 2 line.
Component Code: 15
Heat Exchanger
I Required
Provides a means of conditioning the
LH 2 line prior to the LH 2 entering
the conditioners/gas generators.
Failure Mode
No Applicable
Failure Modes
No Applicable
Failure Modes
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Bo
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failure Effect on System
No sffect. Because the
valve is open except during
venting, failure to
remain closed or leakage
may cause some loss of
propellant.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
B. No effect. Loss of
propellant at the end of
this phase will not
affect the mission.
N/A
N/A
N/A
i • i •
L_Lo
FAILUREMODEEFFECTSANALYSISONSPACETUGMISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 16
Heat Exchanger
I Required
Provides a means of conditioning the
LO line prior to the LO 2 entering
th_ conditioners/gas generators.
Component Code: 17
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 Required
Controls the flow of LH 2 to the
primary and backup LH 2 conditioners/
gas generators for gasification of
the LH 2 and storage as GH 2 in the
GH 2 accumulator.
Failure Mode
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Failure Effect on System
N/A
A & C. No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these,
phases.
Fail to open
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
Component Code: 18
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 Required
Controls the flow of LO 2 to the
primary and backup conditioners/
gas generators for gasification and
storage as GO 2 in the GO 2
accumulator.
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
closing valve 27 and using
the back-up conditioner.
A & C. No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy is provided.
Failure Effe¢= on Vehicle,
Mis sion_ Cre_
N/A
A & C. No effect.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy is provided.
%n
Component Identification
Component Code: 18
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
(Continued)
\
Component Code: 19
Solenoid Valve, N. C..
4 Required
Controls the flow of LH 2 over the
turbopumps, located in the
conditioners, to maintain the pumps
in a chilled condition.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARy PROPULSION SYSTEM
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
A, B, & Co No effect.
Redundancyprovided by
closing valve 28 and
using back-up conditioner
A & C. No effect.
Valve is not required to
operate during these
phases.
B,
A.Fail to close
Fail to remain
closed and
leakage
B.
C .
No effect.
Redundancy provided.
No effect. Failure mode
is not applicable during
this phase.
No effect. Valve is
required to be open during
this phase°
No effect. All propellant_
are dumped overboard prior
to re-docking.
A & B. No effect.
Valve required to be open
during these phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Misslon, Cre_
A, B, & C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
No effect.
Redundancy provided.
No effect. Not
applicable during this
phase.
No effect. Valve is
required to be open durin
this phase.
C. No effect.
A & B. No effect
Ln
On
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARy PROPULSIQN sYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 19
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
(Continued)
C •
Component Code : 20
Check Valve
2 Required
Prevents propellant vapor backflow
from the LH 2 conditioner to the LH 2
feed line.
Component Code: 21
Failure Mode
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
No effect. All
propellants are dumped
overboard prior to
re-docking.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Check Valve
2 Required
Prevents propellant vapor backflow
from the LH^ conditioners to the
LO 2 feed li_e.
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
solenoid shutoff valves.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases•
B• No effect•
Redundancy provided.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A & C. No effect•
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
Ln
O_
Component Identification
Component Code: 21
Check Valve (Continued)
Component Code: 22
Orifice
4 Required
Provides flow control of the LH 2
used to chill the turbopumps.
Component Code: 23
Heat Exchanger
4 Required
Provides a means of cooling the gas
generator turbopump during
operationof LH 2 and LO 2 propellant
conditioner.
Component Code: 24
Exhaust Vent
1 Required
Vents the residual exhaust gases
created during gas generator burn.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXI LIARy_2/10PUL SI0N SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
No Applicable
Failure Modes
No Applicable
Failure Modes
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Failure Effect on System
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancyprovided by
solenoid shutoff valves.
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failure Effec= on Vehicle,
Misslon I Cre_
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
N/A
N/A
N/A
tn
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 25
Check Valve
2 Required
Prevents backflowlof gaseous H 2
from the GH 2 accumulator to the LH 2
propellant conditioners.
Component Code: 26
Check Valve
2 Required
Prevents backflow of gaseous 02
from the GO 2 accumulator to the
LO 2 propellant conditioners.
Failure Mode
Fail to open
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
This line can be isolated
by closing valves,
Component Codes 17 and 27
and using redundant
conditioner.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
This line can be isolated
by closing valves,
Component Codes 18 and 28
and using redundant
conditioner.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
ha
OO
Component Identification
Component Code : 27
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
2 Required
Controls the flow of GH 2 from the
LH 2 propellant conditioners to the
GH 2 accumulator.
Component Code: 28
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
2 Required
Controls the flow of GO from the
LO 2 conditioners to the2GO
accumulators. 2
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fail to open,
fail to remain
ope n
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open,
fail to remain
open
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
check valves, Component
Code 25.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
check valves, Component
Code 26.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew;
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
ha
_D
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY _ SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
Component Code: 29
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 Required
Controls the flow of GH from the
GH accumulator to the _as
generators, the main LH 2 tank and
the thruster pods.
Fail to open
Fail to close,
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
Component Code: 30
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
2 Required
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Be
applicable during these
phases.
No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by the
Controls the flow of GO from the
2
GO 2 accumulators to the gas
generators, the main LO 2 tank and
the thruster pods.
Fail to open
bi-propellant valve in the
gas generator and by the
shutoff valves on the
thruster pods.
A&C. No effect.
B_
Failure mode not
applicable during these
phases.
No effect.
Redundancy provided°
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
OFAILURE M_ODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identlflca=ion
Component Code: 30
Solenoid Valve, N. Co
(Cent inued)
Component Code :
Regulator
2 Required
31
Failure Mode Failure Effect on System
Fail to close, A, B, & Co No effect.
fail to remain Redundancy provided by the
closed and hi-propellant valves in the
leakage gas generator and by the
shutoff valves on the
thruster pods.
Regulates high A & C. No effect°
Failure mode is not
Regulates the flow of GH_ from the applicable during these
GH 2 accumulator to the thrusters, phases.
gas generators, fuel ce!l_an_to_ __ r_,_ __ _ _ ......
_the maln:....propellant_ _ tank: for _'_'_ _-_ __"_ .... _:B.'_ -'_o _._=_- " _ _-_
pressurization, i Redundancy provided.
Regulates low A & Co No effect.
I Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
Failure Effec= on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
Redundancy provided.
A & C° No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
e • J •
O_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Componen= Identification
Component Code : 32
Regulator
2 Required
Regulates the flow of GO^ from the
GO 2 accumulator to the t_rusters,
gas generators, fuel cell and to
the main GO 2 tank for pressurization
Failure Mode Failure Effec= on System
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Regulates high
m. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
Component Code: 33
GH^ AccumUlator
i _equired
Stores GH 2 for use by the
thrusters, fuel cells, gas
Regulates low
No Applicable
Failure Modes
A & C. No effect.
Bo
N/A
generators and for pressurizing
the main LH 2 tank°
Component Code: 34
GO^ Accumulator
i _equired
Stores GO^ for use by the thrusters,
fuel cell_, gas generators and for
_r_su_izin_ the main LO? tank.
No Applicable
Failure Modes
N/A
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
No effect.
Redundancy provided.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission I Cre_
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
N/A
N/A
O_
_o
Component Identification
Component Code: 35
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
i Required
Controls the flow I of GH_ to the
GH 2 accumulator during _he ground
fill operation.
Component Code: 36
Solenoid Valve, N.C.
I Required
Controls the flow of GO 2 to the
GO_ accumulator during the ground
fi_l operation.
Component Code: 37
Filter
1 Required
Removes contaminants from the GH 2
supply during ground fill of the
GH 2 accumulator.
FAILURE M/3DE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Failure Mode
Fail to open
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Clogs
Failure Effect on System
A, B, & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
A, B, & Co No effect.
Redundancy provided by
disconnect, Component
Code 39.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
disconnect, Component
Code 40.
A, B, & Co No effect.
Filter is not used
during these phases. Any
problem encountered during
the fill operation would
be corrected prior to
liftoff.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Cre_
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
Lo
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY P_ SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code : 38
Filter
i Required
Removes contaminants from the GO 2
supply during the ground fill of
the GO 2 accumulator.
Component Code: 39
Quick Disconnect
i Required
Provides a separable connection at
the tug/payload bay interface for
the GH 2 fill operation.
Failure Mode
Clogs
Fail to engage
Fail to disengage
Failure Effect on System
A, B, & C. No effect.
Filter is Dot used during
these phases. Any
problem encountered during
the fill operation would
be corrected prior to
liftoff.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
After the tug completes its
mission and returns to the
orbiter, all pressurants
and propellants are dumped
overboard prior to docking°
In addition, the solenoid
valves on the fill lines
are closed prior to storingl
the tug in the orbiter for
return to earth.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B, & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
O_
FAILURE MODEEFFECTS ,_W_.LYSiS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 39
Quick Disconnect (Continued)
Component Code: 40
Quick Disconnect
i Required
Provides a separable connection at
the tug/payload bay interface for
the GO 2 fill operation.
Failure Mode
Leakage
Fail to engage
Failure Effect on System
B_ Actual Loss
The failure of the tug
disconnects to disengage
at the tug/payload bay
interface will cause the
tug to remain docked to
the orbiter andunable to
perform its mission.
A, B, & Co No effect.
Redundancy provided bY
solenoid shutoff valve 39.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Bo No effect.
After the tug completes it:
mission and returns to the
orbiter, all pressurants
and propellants are dumped
overboard prior to docking
In addition, the solenoid
valves in the fill lines
are closed prior to storing i
the tug in the orbiter for
return to earth° i
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Cre_¢
B. Actual Loss
A, B, & C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
O_
Ln
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Effect on System
Leakage
Component Code: 40
Quick Disconnect (Continued)
Component Code: 41
Solenoid Valve, N. O.
4 Required
Failure Mode
Fail to disengage
Fail to open
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancyprovided by
solenoid shutoff valve 40.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. Actual Loss
The failure of the tug
disconnects to disengage
at the Tug/Payload bay
interface will cause the
tug to remain docked to
the orbiter and unable to
perform its mission.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
Controls the flow of GH_ from the
GH accumulator to the _hruster
po_s.
B .
applicable during these
phases.
No effect.
Valve is normally open
during this phase.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A, B, & C. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. Actual Loss
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B® No effect.
Valve is normally open
during this phase.
O_
O_
FAILURE HODE EFFECTS ANALYSJIS
ON SPACE TUG _,,_,_oo__v_
AUXILIARY PROPULSION PZST:!H
Component Identification
Component Code: 41
Solenoid Valve, N.'O0
(Continued)
Component Code: 42
Solenoid Valve, N. Oo
4 Required
Controls the flow of GO 2 from the
GO 2 accumulator to the
thruster pods.
Failure Mode
Fail to close
Fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
Fail to close
Failure Effect on System
A & Co No _-F_ _ o
Valve is ..... _
_o= _',= iy open
during this phase,
B No effect°
Flow control of D_-oT_] iant:
to the thrusters is
obtained by using valves
29_ 30, and 43o
A_ B, & Co No effect.
Redundancy provided by
valves 29, 30, and 43.
A & Co No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases°
B No effect°
Valve is _ _ opennorm= i ±y
during this phase°
A & Co No effect°
Valve is normally open
during these phases°
Failure _="= =ec_ on Vehicle,
Mission, Crew
A & C° No effect.
B o No effect.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A. & Co No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
Bo No effect.
Valve is normally open
during this phase°
A & Co No effect.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
O_
Component Identification
Component Code: 42
Solenoid Valve, N.O.
(Continued)
Component Code: 43
Thruster Bi-Propellant Valve,
Failure Mode
Fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
B. No effect.
Flow control of propellant;
to the thrusters is
obtained by using valves
29, 30, and 43.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
valves 29, 30, and 43.
A & C° No effect.
Solenoid Operated, N. C.
16 Required
Controls the flow of GH 2 and GO 2
to the thruster.
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Tug has one thruster out
capability.
A & Co No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B. No effect.
A, B, & C. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Loss of one thruster will
not prevent the tug from
performing its mission.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
Co
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS #_N_YSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY FROPULSION SYSTE_I
Component Identification Failure Mode
Component Code : 43
Thruster Bi-Propellant Valve,
Solenoid Operated, No C.
(Continued)
Component Code: 44
APS Thruster Assembly
16 Required
Provides a nominal thrust of 30
pounds for attitude control of the
space tug during mission coast
phases, mid-course correction,
lateral and transverse maneuvers
during rendezvous and docking and
to perform vehicle and sensor
pointing as required.
Component Code: 45
Bi-Propellant Valve,
LH 2 Conditioner
2 Required
Controls the flow of GH 2 and LO 2
from the accumulators to the
LH 2 conditioners.
Burn-Thru
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
B® Actual Loss
GH 2 and GO 2 supply to each
thruster pod can be
controlled by valves 41
and 42. This would cause
loss of one thruster pod.
A & C. No effect.
Not required to operate
during these phases.
B. Actual Loss
Engine burn-thru could
result in fire and
explosion and destroy the
APS system and damage
the tug.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided by
back-up conditioner.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B • No effect.
The loss of one thruster
pod mayaffect the
response time for
maneuvering, but will not
cause loss of mission.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
Bo Actual Loss
Mission loss would
result from fire and
explosion.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
O_
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 45
Bi-Propellant Valve,
LH 2 Conditioner (Continued)
Component Code: 46
Bi-Propellant Valve,
LO 2 Conditioner
2 Required
Controls the flow of GH 2 and LO 2
from the accumulators to the
LO 2 conditioner.
Failure Mode
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
A & C. No effect.
The propellant flow to the
bi-propellant valves is
shut off by the
accumulator solenoid
valves, Component Code 29,
during these phases.
B, Probable Loss
Any flow or leakage
through the bi-prope&lant
valves would result in
uncontrolled burning in th_
gas generator, or, in the
case of only one propellanl
leaking, the leakage would
result in abnormal usage
of the propellant gas and
could prematurely deplete
the propellant supply.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Bo No effect.
Redundancy provided by
back-up conditioner.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A & C. No effect.
B. Probable Loss
Premature depletion of
propellant could cause
termination of mission.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. No effect.
Redundancy provided.
OFAILURE MODE EFFECTS A_$ALYSiS
o_ SPACE TUG >_!ssio_
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYST_
Component Identification Failure Mode
Component Code: 46
Bi-Propellant Valve,
LO 2 Conditioner (Continued)
Component Code: 47
Filter
1 Required
Removes contaminants from the GH 2
supply used to pressurize the
main LH 2 tank.
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
leakage
Clogs
Failure Effect on System Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission. Crew
A & Co No effect°
The propellant zC_io_v-to the
bi-propellant valves is
shut off by the
accumulator solenoid
valves, Component Code 30,
during these phases.
Bo Probable Loss
Any flow or leakage
through the bi-propellant
valves would result in
uncontrolled burning in
the gas generator if both
propellant were leaking,
or in the case of only
one propellant leaking,
the leakage would be
vented overboard by the
by the gas generator
exhaust vent and could
prematurely deplete the
propellant supply.
A & Co No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
A & C. No effect°
B® Probable Loss
Premature depletion of
propellants could cause
termination of mission.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
"-4
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROP_SlON SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code: 47
Filter (Continued)'
Component Code: 48
Filter
i Required
Removes contaminants from the GO 2
supply used to pressurize the main
LO 2 tank.
Component Code: 49
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
i Required
Controls the flow of GH 2 from the
GH 2 accumulator to the main LH 2
tank for pressurization.
Failure Mode
Clogs
Fail to open
i
J
Failure Effect on System
B. Actual Loss
Unable to pressurize the
main LH 2 tank. The loss oJ
pressurization capability
will cause the main
engine to shut down.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not,
applicable during these
phases.
B, Actual Loss
Unable to pressurize the
main LO 2 tank. The loss
of pressurization
capability will cause the
main engine to shut down.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B. Actual Loss
Loss of the main engine
on the tug will cause
loss of mission.
A & C. No effect.
Not applicable during
these phases.
B. Actual Loss
Loss of the main engine
on the tug will cause
loss of mission.
A & C. No effect.
Component Identification
Component Code: 49
Solenoid Valve, N. C.
(Continued)
Component Code: 50
Solenoid Valve, N. Co
I Required
Controls the flow of GO 2 from the
GO 2 accumulator to the main LO 2
tank for pressurization.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS I_NA_LYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY pROPULSION SYSTEm[
Failure Mode
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
major leakage
Fail to open
Failure Effect on System
B, Actual Loss
Unable to pressurize the
LH 2 tank. The loss of
pressurization capability
will cause the main
engine to shut down.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
Be Probable Loss
The continuous flow of
GH 2 to the main LII2 tank
will cause the tank to be
over-pressurized and the
GH 2 will be vented over-
board. This venting may
cause premature depletion
of APS propellants.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B.
A&C.
Bo
A&C.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mis sion_ C re_._
Actual Loss
Loss of the main engine
on the tug Will cause
loss of mission.
No effect.
Probable Loss
The premature depletion
of APS propellants will
cause loss of mission.
The severity of the
effect will depend on
the time of occurrence
in the mission time
frame.
No effect.
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPTTT._TON SYSTEM
_O
Component Identification
Component Code: 50
Solenoid Valve, N.'C.
(Continued)
Component Code: 51
Orifice
i Required
Provides flow control of the GH 2
used to pressurize the LH 2 main
tank from the APS GH 2
accumulator.
Failure Mode
Fail to close,
fail to remain
closed and
major leakage
No Applicable
Failure Modes
Failure Effect on System
B. Actual Loss
Unable to pressurize the
main LO 2 tank. The loss
of pressurization
capability will cause the
main engine to shut down.
A & C. No effect.
Failure mode is not
applicable during these
phases.
B, Probable Loss
The continuous flow of
GO 2 to the main L02 tank
will cause the tank to be
overpressurized and the
GO 2 will be vented over-
board. This venting may
cause premature depletion
of APS propellants.
N/A
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
B. Actual Loss
Loss of. main engine on
tug will cause loss of
mission.
A & C. No effect.
B, Probable Loss
The premature depletion
of APS propellants will
cause loss of mission.
The severity of the
effect will depend on
the time of occurrence
in the mission time
frame.
N/A
-.j
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY PROPULSION SYSTEM
Component Identification Failure Mode
Component Code : 52
Orifice
i Required
Provides flow control of the GO 2
used to pressurize the GO 2 main
tank from the APS GO 2 accumulator.
Component Code: 53
LH 2 Storage Tank, APS
i Required
Stores LH for use as propellant
by the AP_ thrusters and for use
by the main engine during the idle
mode start sequence. The tank
also stores LH 2 for conversion
to gases for pressurizing the
main engine LH 2 tank and for
supplying GH 2 to the fuel cell.
Component Code: 54
LOp Storage Tank, APS
i Required
Stores LO 2 for use as propellant
by the APS thrusters and for use
by the main engine during the idle
mode start sequence. The tank alsc
stores LO 2 for conversion to gases
for pressurizing the main engine
LO 2 tank and for supplying GO 2 to
the fuel cell.
NoApplicable
Failure Modes
No Applicable
Failure Modes
No Applicable
Failure Modes
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failu_ Effect on System
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
--J
Ln
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON SPACE TUG MISSION
AUXILIARY pROPT_TON SYSTEM
Component Identification
Component Code:
LHp Conditioners
2 _equired
Failure Mode
55
Failure Effect on System
Fail to operate A & C. No effect.
Not required to operate
Converts the LH 2 to GH 2 for use as
propellant and pressurization
gases. The conditioners contain a
gas generator, a turbopump, a
heat exchanger and bi-propellant
valves to control the flow of
propellant to the gas generator
burner. The bi-propellant valves
are analyzed as Component Code 45.
Component Code: 56
LO 2 Conditioners
2 Required
Converts the LO 2 to GO 2 for use as
propellant and pressurization
gases. The conditioners contain a
gas generator, a turbopump, a heat
exchanger and bi-propellant valves
to control the flow of propellant
to the gas generator burner. The
bi-propellant valves are analyzed
as Component Code 46.
Fail to operate
B.
during these phases.
A&C.
B.
No effect.
Redundancy provided by
back-up conditioner.
No effect.
Not required to operate
during these phases.
No effect.
Redundancy provided by
back-up conditioners.
Failure Effect on Vehicle,
Mission_ Crew
A & C. No effect.
B. No effect.
A & C. No effect.
B° No effect.
Redundancy provided by
back-up conditioners.
REFERENCES
Baseline Tug Definition Document, Preliminary Design Office Program
Development, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, dated March 15, 1972o
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